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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
From the beginning of Mr. Erickson's trial to the end, he was repeatedly deprived
of his constitutional rights by the State, including his rights to equal protection, to due
process and a fair trial, and to be free from self-incrimination. The State began the trial
by using its peremptory challenges to exclude only men from the jury, violating
Mr. Erickson's right to equal protection. Throughout the trial the State also violated
Mr. Erickson's due process right to a fair trial. This began during the State's opening
arguments when the State vouched for the veracity of the alleged victims in this case,
and proceeded through closing arguments, including many instances of prosecutorial
misconduct.

The State's misconduct also spread into the trial itself where the

prosecutor made himself a witness by using facts not in evidence to ask questions, and
by twice trying to get in information related to Mr. Erickson's prior drug use and drug
charges.

The prosecutor also elicited testimony that Mr. Erickson refused to be

interviewed or answer questions about the allegations in this case, violating
Mr. Erickson's rights to due process and to be free from self-incrimination. Finally, the
State used improper and irrelevant "bad act" evidence, that Mr. Erickson had not paid
child support, to aid in convicting Mr. Erickson. Therefore, this case presents several
issues for the Court's review.
First, it presents an issue never decided by the Idaho Supreme Court regarding
when an objection must be made to a party's use of peremptory to challenges pursuant
to Batson.

It also potentially presents issues of first impression in Idaho regarding

whether the State must object to the timelines of a Batson challenge below and

1

whether, absent a timely objection, a Batson violation can be reviewed for fundamental
error.

Mr. Erickson contends he made a timely objection to the State's peremptory

challenges, and even if he did not, the State's failure to object below to the timeliness of
the challenge below waives the State's ability to raise this on appeal. Finally, if his
Batson challenge is deemed untimely, Mr. Erickson contends the prosecutor's actions in

this case should be reviewed for fundamental error.
Additionally, this case involves extensive prosecutorial misconduct by the
prosecuting attorney in this case.

Throughout the State's opening and closing

arguments, as well as its questioning of witnesses, several instances of prosecutorial
misconduct occurred resulting in the denial of Mr. Erickson's right to a fair trial. The
prosecutor also impermissibly elicited testimony on cross-examination of the initial
investigating officer of this case, Tony Vollmer, that Mr. Erickson did not come in to be
interviewed and refused to answer questions about the accusations in this case.
Finally, Mr. Erickson contends that the district court erred in admitting testimony
that Mr. Erickson had not paid any child support because no 404(b) notice was
provided, and it was improper character evidence.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2004, Detective Tony Vollmer, with the Bannock County Sheriff's Department
was contacted regarding allegations by Mr. Erickson's step-daughter, L.H., that
Mr. Erickson had inappropriately touched her while residing in St. Charles in Bear Lake
County.

(Trial Tr., p.388, Ls.16-25, p.389, Ls.21-23, p.391, Ls.17-24.)

Later,

Mr. Erickson's daughter, C.E. also alleged that she had been inappropriately touched by
Mr. Erickson. (Trial Tr., p.89, Ls.1-14.) Charges were not filed against Mr. Erickson

2

until 2007. (R., pp.53-54.) During this time, Mr. Erickson who was separated from his
wife, Tammy Erickson, 1 attempted to reconcile with her before again separating. (Trial
Tr., p.307, L.17 - p.308, L.10.)

The separation became quite tumultuous at times,

culminating in Tammy Erickson going to Mr. Erickson's parents' home with three of the
children and taking the truck that she believed belonged to her as well as Mr. Erickson.
(Trial Tr., p.309, L.12-p.310, L.3, p.437, L.10-p.441, L.19.)
Mr. Erickson was ultimately charged by Information with three counts of lewd
conduct with minor in 2007. (R., pp.53-54.) Prior to trial, the State filed a Notice of
Intent to Introduce Evidence of other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts under 404(b) seeking to
use evidence of other acts committed against the alleged victims consistent with the
testimony given by the alleged victims at the preliminary hearing.

(R., p.27.)

The

defense filed a Pretrial Motion making several motions, including moving to "preclude
the State from introducing allegations of abuse outside Bear Lake County" because this
evidence violates 404(b), is more prejudicial than probative, and should otherwise be
excluded under relevancy standards. (R., p.103.) The motion also asked the court "[t]o
prohibit, in limine, the State or its witnesses, from in any manner raising other bad acts
of the Defendant, including but not limited to his pending drug charges in Utah, drug
usage and or possession during the marriage, on the grounds of undue prejudice."

(R., p.104.)
These matters were taken up at a pretrial hearing. (R., pp.175-76.) The district
court subsequently issued an Order Re: Motions in Limine. (R., pp.179-85.) In relation

1

Because several witnesses in this trial have the last name of Erickson, these
witnesses will be referred to by their first and last name, rather than Mr. or Ms. Erickson,
to avoid confusion, with the exception of the defendant, Mr. Erickson.
3

to the allegations of prior misconduct occurring in Bannock County, the court ruled
evidence of prior misconduct could be admissible in this case, but that it could not
"complete the requisite two-prong analysis because it is not aware of the details of the
evidence sought to be introduced."

(R., p.182.)

Therefore, the court held that no

evidence of allegations of abuse outside of Bear Lake County could be admitted without
first having a hearing outside of the presence of the jury for the court to conduct the
proper two-prong analysis. (R., p.182.) In relation to the defenses' request to prohibit
other bad act evidence, the court ruled "[a]ny evidence of Defendant's criminal acts or
bad acts pertaining to illegal drugs or controlled substances shall not be presented to
the jury by any attorney or witness without the necessary hearing outside the presence
of the jury." (R., p.184.) The court also noted the State would not be able to introduce
such evidence even with a hearing unless the court is convinced it is being done for a
proper purpose under404(b). 2 (R., p.184.)
The case ultimately proceeded to trial.

During voir dire, while the parties

exercised their peremptory challenges, a discussion between counsel and the court was
held off the record. (Supp. Tr., p.217, Ls.8-9). The district court then determined that
the parties were in agreement regarding who would be on the jury, the jurors' names
were read, and the district court confirmed that the parties agreed with the jury
designation. (Trial Tr., p.10, L.4 - p.11, L.19.) The jury was then sworn in and a half
hour recess was taken. (Trial Tr., p.11, L.23, p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.5.) Prior to the jury
being brought back in, defense counsel explained, "I don't want to waive that objection.

2

The State's 404(b) notice never disclosed or cited "bad acts" related to the defendant's
drug usage or drug charges.

4

So I'll make that, I guess, in the morning, your Honor." (Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.14-16.) The
court responded, "I have it on the record as of now that you want to make an objection
in the morning. We'll come back at 8:30 and allow you to do that. ... You are not waiving
the objection." (Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.17-21.)
Later, after the jury had left for the day, the court took up Mr. Erickson's
objection.

(Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.)

Counsel for Mr. Erickson explained that he

objected to the State's use of its peremptory challenges to only eliminate men from the
jury, noting that the United States Supreme Court has held that you cannot disqualify
jurors based on race or gender and that appeared to be what the state was doing. (Trial
Tr., p.39, L.14 - p.40, L.6.) In response, the State argued that it did not believe that this
was a constitutional basis to declare a mistrial and start over.

(Trial Tr., p.40,

L.19 - p.42, L.2.) After taking the evening to review the relevant case law, the district
court denied the defense's objection, finding that, in this case, the jury did not end up
being all of one type like in the United State's Supreme Court's decisions in Baston v.
Kentucky or J.E.B. v. Arizona4 and that white males are not a protected class;
therefore, in this case there was not a showing of discrimination by striking a protected
class from the jury.

(Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.3-12, p.60, Ls.24 - p.61, L.15.)

During the trial, C.E., Mr. Erickson's daughter, testified that around the end of
March 2004, she had come to St. Charles to visit her grandparents and father. (Trial
Tr., p.83, Ls.4-9.) During her stay she slept in her Grandma and Grandpa, Margaret
and Glade, Erickson's camper with her brother and Mr. Erickson.

(Trial Tr., p.83,

L.17 - p.84, L.7.) C.E., her brother, and Mr. Erickson all slept in the same bed. (Trial
3

476 U.S. 79 (1986).

5

Tr., p.84, Ls.4-7.) She testified that Mr. Erickson "touched my boobs and my butt and
asked me if I liked it how daddy touched me, and then I told him no, and that I wanted to
go to bed." (Trial Tr., p.84, Ls.20-22.) She explained that Mr. Erickson touched her
under her shirt, on her belly and breast, and then he rubbed her butt. 5 (Trial Tr., p.84,
L.23 - p.85, L.4.) She said she was approximately 10 years old at the time. (Trial
Tr., p.85, Ls.11-12.)
On cross-examination, counsel for Mr. Erickson had C.E. review her testimony
from the preliminary hearing in this case, where she testified that this event occurred
around the end of July 2004 and that she remembered that because it was after her
birthday in July.

(Trial Tr., p.88, Ls.4-15.)

She agreed that that is what she had

previously testified to under oath and answered affirmatively when asked if she was
telling the truth at the preliminary hearing. (Trial Tr., p.88, Ls.10-24.) She also testified
that when she was interviewed by Bright Tomorrows she told them that this touching
had happened after her birthday on July 9, 2004.

(Trial Tr., p.89, Ls.1-14.) When

asked why her testimony had changed, C.E. testified that after she, her grandmother,
her mother, and her sister thought about it, "we realized that it wasn't." (Trial Tr., p.89,
Ls.18-23.)
L.H., C.E.'s sister, testified that between 2001 and 2003, she was inappropriately
touched by her step-father, Mr. Erickson. (Trial Tr., p.111, Ls.5-24.) She testified that
the first instance occurred when she came home from school one day. (Trial Tr., p.111,
L.20 - p.112, L.19.) She explained she was in the kitchen with Mr. Erickson and he
4

511 U.S. 127 (1994).
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began touching her boobs and butt outside of her clothes.

(Trial Tr., p.111,

L.20 - p.113, L.5.) She also testified that in 2003, Mr. Erickson again touched her
boobs and butt outside her clothing in the camper trailer behind Mr. Erickson's parents',
Margaret and Glade Erickson's, house. (Tira! Tr., p.113, L.20 - p.115, L.11.) L.H. also
testified that the touching continued from Bear Lake County when they moved to
Pocatello, although she did not describe any specific instances.

(Trial Tr., p.117,

Ls.5-16.) L.H. admitted that she had previously reported that she does not remember
everything and that her Grandma Snow and her mother Tammy Erickson remember
more than her. (Trial Tr., p.122, L.22 - p.123, L.2, p.138, Ls.4-7.)
When questioned further about spending time with Mr. Erickson in the summer of
2003, L.H. stated that she did not spend time with him by herself. (Trial Tr., p.145,
Ls.2-20.) The defense then asked, "[s]o the incidents in the trailer had to have occurred
in 2002, to which L.H. responded "somewhere in that time frame yes." (Trial Tr., p.145,
L.25 - p.146, L.2.) However, on rebuttal, L.H. clarified that she was living in St. Charles
with Mr. Erickson and her mother part of 2003, prior to moving to Soda Springs with her
mother when Mr. and Ms. Erickson separated later that year, but she did not recall
anything taking place during that time period between her and her stepfather stating, "I
wasn't home a lot, and no, I don't recall any." (Trial Tr., p.149, Ls.5-22.)
The State later called Mydell Yeager, a licensed counselor who counsels victims
of abuse, who testified regarding markers or dynamics of victim/offender relationships,
(Trial Tr., p.189, L.13 - p.209, L.2.) The defense then called Dr. Danial Rybicki, a

5

There was no testimony by C.E. regarding whether when Mr. Erickson allegedly
touched C.E.'s butt, it was over or under her clothing. (Trial Tr., p.80, L.20 - p.109,
L.15.)
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psychologist who has practiced both clinical and forensic psychology in the area of child
abuse. (Trial Tr., p.216, L.16 - p.218, L.24.) During his testimony Dr. Rybicki explained
the various factors which might cause a child to falsely report and problems that occur
during child abuse investigations, and analyzed the investigation in this case pointing
out things that could have affected the reporting or could be an indication of a false
report.

(Trial Tr., p.232, L. 18 - p.295, L.20.)

Dr. Rybicki did not testify regarding

whether he thought L.H. or C.E. were abused or whether they were truthful.

(Trial

Tr., p.235, Ls.2-22.)
As one of its witnesses, the defense called Detective Tony Vollmer from Bannock
County, who initially investigated the case. (Trial Tr., p.388, L. 15 - p.399, L.13.) She
testified regarding her investigation into L.H.'s accusations and to statements made by
both L.H. and C.E. during her investigation that were contrary to what the girls testified
to at trial.

(Trial rr., p.388, L.15 - p.399, L.13.)

During his cross-examination of

Detective Vollmer, the prosecutor asked her whether she attempted to interview
Mr. Erickson regarding the charges in this case. (Trial Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L.13.)
She explained that she had tried to set up an interview with Mr. Erickson, but he refused
to speak with her regarding the allegations. (Trial Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L. 13.) The
prosecutor then verified that she was never able to get Mr. Erickson's version of event
because "he never came in for an interview.'' (Trial Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L.13.)
The State subsequently called Tammy Erickson as a rebuttal witness.

(Trial

Tr., p.436, Ls.17-19.) Tammy Erickson testified regarding the incident where she, and
her children, came to Mr. Erickson's and took the truck. (Trial Tr., p.437, L.10 - p.441,
L.19.)

During this line of questioning the State asked Tammy Erickson if she was
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getting child support for the children.

(Trial Tr., p.439, Ls.9-25.)

Defense counsel

immediately objected stating this was irrelevant and improper character evidence. (Trial
Tr., p.439, Ls.9-25.)

After the State argued that it was simply trying to show her

desperate need for a vehicle, the district court overruled the objection, and Tammy
Erickson was allowed to testify that she was not receiving any child support.

(Trial

Tr., p.439, Ls.19-25.) Defense counsel also objected to the prosecutor asking Tammy
Erickson, "So you were unaware that the sheriff's office simply had lost that file and had
not proceeded," noting this was hearsay and submitting or assuming facts not in
evidence.

(Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.10-14.) The district court allowed the question to be

answered. (Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.15-18.)
The State and defense then presented their closing arguments. At the close of
the State's rebuttal, outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial based on the State's repeated vouching for the witnesses during his closing
arguments. (Trial Tr., p.527, L.25 - p.528, L.25.) The district court delayed ruling on
the motion to see what the verdict was. (Trial Tr., p.529, Ls.18-22.)
At approximately 4:30 in the afternoon, the case was submitted to the jury.
{R., p.234.) At 9:38 that night, the jury returned with a verdict of guilty of sexual abuse
of a child an counts one and two and not guilty on count three. (R., pp.234, 248-50.)
Counsel for Mr. Erickson renewed his motion for a mistrial, and the district court stated it
would allow the closing argument to be transcribed and briefing to be filed.
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(Trial

Tr., p.540, L.8 - p.545, L. 1.) Following briefing from both sides, the district court denied
Mr. Erickson's motion for a mistrial.6 (R., pp.272-85.)
Mr. Erickson filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's Decision on Motion
for Mistrial. (R., pp.286-88.) Mr. Erickson was sentenced to concurrent sentences of
fifteen years, with three years fixed, to be served concurrently with his sentence of
seven years, with three years fixed in Bear Lake County Case CR-2007-1253. (Trial
Tr., p.547, Ls.3-9, p.562, Ls.9-19; R., pp.300-01.) Following Mr. Erickson's sentencing,
counsel for Mr. Erickson filed an Amended Notice of Appeal. (Trial Tr., p.563, L.23 p.564, L.10; R., p.296-98.)

6

Because Mr. Erickson's objection to the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was
made after the case was submitted to the jury, thereby making it reviewable only for
fundamental error, the denial of Mr. Erickson's motion for mistrial is not being pursued
separately in this appeal. Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 252 P.2d 971 (1952)
([O]rdinarily an objection comes too late for the purpose of review on appeal, if made for
the first time after the jury has retired or the cause has been submitted to them, or after
the close of the arguments .... "); State v. Lute, 108 Idaho 905, 702 P.2d 1365 (1985)
(reviewing the untimely objected to prosecutorial misconduct for fundamental error
when reviewing the denial of his motion for mistrial). Instead, the prosecutorial
misconduct alleged in this motion has been argued in section ll(C)(3), along with other
unobjected to misconduct that was not included in the motion for mistrial, but
Mr. Erickson contends constitutes fundamental error.
10

ISSUES
1.

Did the State violate Mr. Erickson's and the jurors' right to equal protection when
it used its peremptory challenges to only strike men from the jury?

2.

Did the prosecutor's misconduct in this case violate Mr. Erickson's rights to due
process and a fair trial?

3.

Were Mr. Erickson's rights to due process and to be free from self incrimination
violated when the State elicited testimony from Detective Vollmer that
Mr. Erickson refused to come in for an interview?

4.

Did the district court commit reversible error when it admitted evidence of prior
bad acts of the defendant?

5.

Did the repeated misconduct and the erroneous admission of evidence in this
case result in cumulative error depriving Mr. Erickson of a fair trial?
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.....

ARGUMENT
I.
The State Violated Mr. Erickson's And The Jurors' Rights To Equal Protection When It
Used Its Peremptory Challenges To Only Strike Men From The Jury
A.

Introduction
This case presents an issue never before decided by the Idaho Supreme Court

regarding the timing of an objection to a party's use of peremptory challenges pursuant
to Batson v. Kentucky. It also potentially presents issues of first impression in Idaho
regarding whether the opposing party must object to the timelines of a Batson challenge
below and whether, absent a timely objection, a Batson violation can be reviewed for
fundamental error. Mr. Erickson contends he made a timely objection to the State's
peremptory challenges, and even if he did not, the State's failure to object below to the
timeliness of the challenge below waives the State's ability to raise this defense on
appeal. Finally, if his Batson challenge is deemed untimely, Mr. Batson contends the
prosecutor's actions in this case should be reviewed for fundamental error.
Mr. Erickson asserts the State violated his constitutional right to equal protection when it
used its peremptory challenges to exclude only men from the jury.
B.

Standard Of Review
The determination of whether peremptory challenges have been exercised in a

discriminatory manner presents a mixed issue of law and fact. It is ultimately a claim
grounded in constitutional principles over which the appellate court exercises free
review. See State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159,161, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 (2000); State v.
Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 678, 904. P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 1995). However, when
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assessing the district's court's findings regarding the State's explanations for its
peremptory challenges on appeal, the district court's findings will only be overturned if
they are clearly erroneous in light of the facts as a whole. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82,
87, 856 P.2d 872, 877 (1993).
C.

The State Violated Mr. Erickson's And The Jurors' Rights To Equal Protection
When It Used Its Peremptory Challenges To Only Strike Men From The Jury
In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court established a three step

inquiry to determine if peremptory challenges have been exercised in a discriminatory
manner. 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986). See also Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168
(2005); State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 87, 856 P.2d 872, 877 (1993); State v. Owen, 129
Idaho 920, 932, 935 P.2d 183, 195 (Ct. App.1997). First, the defendant must make a
prima facia showing that "the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of

discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94; Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d
at 877. Next, if the defendant has established a prima facia case, the burden shifts to
the State to adequately explain the exclusion by offering a race or gender neutral
justification for its strikes. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94; J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141
(1994); Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d at 877. Lastly, if a race or gender neutral
reason is offered for the challenge, the district court must then determine whether that
explanation overcomes the inference of discrimination established by the defendant's
prima facia showing. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d at 877.
Although Batson initially only applied to racial discrimination, in J.E.B. v.
Alabama, the United States Supreme Court extended · Batson to cases of gender

discrimination as well noting, "[djiscrimination in jury selection, whether based on race
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or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community and the individual jurors who
are wrongfully excluded from participation in the judicial process." 511 U.S. at 140.
Furthermore, in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), the United States Supreme Court
found that the juror's right to equal protection is also at issue when the State uses their
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner, and, even though it is the juror's
right to equal protection, the defendant still has standing to assert the equal protection
claim of an excluded juror. Powers, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
In J.E.B., much like the case at issue, the State used all but one of its peremptory
challenges to strike only men from the jury.

J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129.

The court

explained that "[w]hen state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on
gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative abilities of
men and women." Id. at 140. Such discrimination creates the potential for cynicism,
particularly in cases such as rape, sexual harassment, and paternity, where
gender-related issues are prominent.

Id.

This can create the impression that the

judicial system has acquiesced to keeping one gender from fully participating or that the
'"deck has been stacked' in favor of one side." Id.
Here, during the portion of the hearing where the parties exercised their
peremptory challenges, a discussion between counsel and the court was held off the
record. (Supp. Tr., p.217, Ls.8-9). The district court then determined that the parties
were in agreement regarding who would be on the jury, the jurors' names were read,
and the district court confirmed with the parties that they agreed with the jury
designation. (Trial Tr., p.10, L.4 - p.11, L.19.) The jury was sworn in and a half hour
recess was taken. (Trial Tr., p.11, L.23, p.12, L.21 - p.13, l.5.) Prior to the jury being
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brought back in defense counsel stated, "I don't want to waive that objection. So I'll
make that, I guess, in the morning, your Honor." (Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.14-16.) The court
responded, "I have it on the record as of now that you want to make an objection in the
morning. We'll come back at 8:30 and allow you to do that.. .. You are not waiving the
objection." (Trial Tr., p.13, Ls.17-21.) Later, after the jury had left for the day, the court
took up Mr. Erickson's objection. (Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.1-15.)
Because it is not clear from the record on appeal, whether the Batson challenge
was made prior to the jury being sworn, this Court must consider whether Mr. Erickson's
challenge was untimely based on the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding in State v.
Hansen, 127 Idaho 675, 904 P.2d 945 (Ct. App. 1995), finding that for a Batson

challenge to be timely, "a Batson motion must be made before the jury is sworn, or it is
waived" for the purposed of appeal. Id. at 678, 904 P.2d at 948. Therefore, in this
case, the inquiry must begin with whether Mr. Erickson made a timely objection to the
State's use of its peremptory challenges.

Mr. Erickson contends his objection was

timely made and his challenge should be considered on appeal. Furthermore, the State
.violated his and the jurors' right to equal protection, when it used its peremptory
challenges to only exclude men from the jury.

1.

Mr. Erickson's Batson Challenge Should Be Considered On Appeal

The timeliness of when a Batson challenge must be made is an issue which has
never been addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. Mr. Erickson asserts that he made
a timely objection preserving the issue for appeal.

Alternatively, if Mr. Erickson's

objection is deemed untimely, this case presents two issues of first impression. First,
whether the State can now object to timeliness on appeal absent an objection below,
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and second, whether fundamental error should be applied to review the prosecutor's
discriminatory use of his peremptory challenges in this case.
Mr. Erickson contends his objection should be deemed to have been timely
made. Furthermore, the State should be foreclosed from challenging the timeliness of
his objection because it failed to object below. Finally, even if Mr. Erickson's objection
is found to be untimely, this Court should review the State's exercise of peremptory
challenges for fundamental error in this case.

a.

Mr. Erickson Made A Timely Objection Below: Therefore. This
Issue ls Preserved For Appeal

In Fordv. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991), the United States Supreme Court noted
that the State's were given the discretion to determine when an objection must be made
to be timely under Batson, provided such a determination comported with the United
States Supreme Court standards for assessing the adequacy of independent state
procedural grounds to bar Constitutional claims.

Ford, 498 U.S. at 423-24.

Mr. Erickson urges this Court to find that his objection in this case was timely made.
The only case to address the timeliness of a Batson challenge in Idaho has been
State v. Hansen. 127 Idaho 675, 904 P.2d 945 (Ct. App. 1995).

In Hansen, the

defendant's challenge under Batson was granted and the entire panel was struck after
the State used ten out of eleven peremptory challenges to remove men from the panel.
Id. at 677, 904 P.2d at 947. On appeal, the defendant argued that his retrial should

have been barred based on double jeopardy grounds because the mistrial was declared
after the jury was sworn. Id. Both below and on appeal, the State argued that the
Batson challenge was untimely and should not have been granted. Id. at 677-78, 904
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P.2d at 947-48. The Court of Appeals ultimately held that double jeopardy did not bar
retrial because the defense had made the motion for mistrial and that any error in
granting the Batson challenge was irrelevant because the State was able to retry the
defendant. Id. at 678-79, 904 P.2d at 948-49. To give guidance to the trial bench and
bar, in making its ruling the Court of Appeals also held that a Batson challenge made
after the jury is sworn is untimely, waiving the issue on appeal. Id. at 678, 904 P.2d at
948.
Mr. Erickson contends that the authority relied upon by the Court in Hansen to
reach this decision is not applicable to a challenge under Batson; therefore, Hansen
should not be followed. Furthermore, this Court should apply a standard that at the very
least allows an objection to made within a reasonable time after the jury has been
sworn.

i.

This Court Should Not Adopt The Reasoning In Hansen

In Hansen the Court of Appeals noted that other jurisdictions have specifically
held that a Batson challenge must be made before the jury is sworn or it is untimely and
waived for appeal.7 Hansen, 127 Idaho at 678, 904 P.2d at 948. See a/so State v.

7

The Court of Appeals was correct that other jurisdictions have required a Batson
objection to be made prior to the jury being sworn (or the venire dismissed). See
McCroryv. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1244 (2d. Cir. 1996); United States v. Parham, 16
F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir.1994);United States v. Cashwell, 950 F.2d 699, 704 (11th
Cir.1992); United States v. Masat, 948 F.2d 923, 927 (5th Cir.1991); Government of
Virgin Islands v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1986); Ross v. State, 581 So.2d 495
(Ala.1991); State v. Harris, 157 Ariz. 35,754 P.2d 1139 (1988); Pacee v. State, 306Ark.
563, 816 S.W.2d 856 (1991); People v. Thompson, 50 Cal.3d 134, 785 P.2d 857
(1990); State v. Robinson, 237 Conn. 238, 676 a.2d 384 (1996); Tursio v. U.S., 634
A.2d 1205 (D. C. Ct. App. 1993); State v Castillo, 486 So.2d 565 (Fla.1986); People v.
Andrews, 132 111.2d 451, 548 N.E. 2d 1025; Simmons v. Commonwealth, 746 S.W.2d
393; Stanley v. State, 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267 (1988); Thomas v. State, 517 So.2d
1285 (Miss. 1987); State v. Parker, 836 S.E.2d 930 (Mo. 1992); State v. Parrish, 327
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Jones, 218 Wis.2d 599, 602, 581 N.W.2d 561 (1998) (stating "[m]ost courts have held
that a Batson challenge is timely if it is raised prior to the swearing of the jury or the
dismissal of the venire" and citing cases from these jurisdictions). The Court of Appeals
then cited I.C. § 19-2006, which requires that a challenge to the jury panel must be
taken before a juror is sworn, must be in writing, and must plainly and distinctly state the
grounds for the challenge, to support its finding that this standard should also apply in
Idaho. Hansen, 127 Idaho at 678, 904 P.2d at 948 (quoting I.C. § 19-2006). The Court
also noted that challenges to the jury panel or an individual juror because of errors or
discrimination during the jury selection process must be made prior to the jury being
empanelled citing the Court of Appeals previous decisions in State v. Yon, 115 Idaho
907, 771 P.2d 925 (Ct. App. 1989) and State v. Ruybal, 102 Idaho 885, 643 P.2d 835
(Ct. App. 1982). Id.
Mr. Erickson contends that the authority relied upon by the Court of Appeals is
not applicable to a challenge under Batson and should not be applied in this case. First,
although § 19-2006 does state that "[a] challenge to the panel must be taken before a
juror is sworn, and must be in writing, and must plainly and distinctly state the facts
constituting the ground of the challenge" it does not apply and should not apply to
objections made pursuant to Batson. I.C. § 19-2006.
Idaho Code section 19-2004 defines a challenge to the panel as "an objection

Mont. 88, 111 P.3d 671 (Mont. 2005); State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150
(1986); State v. Wilson, 117 N.M. 11, 868 P.2d 656 (Ct. App. 1993); People v. Harris,
151 A.D.2d 961,542 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1989); State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54,358 S.E.2d 701
(1987), overruled on other grounds by State v. Chapman, 317 S.C. 302,454 S.E.2d 317
(1995); State v. Peck, 719 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986); Taylor v. State, 825
S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Ct. App.1992); State v. Rosa-Re, 190 P.3d 1259 (Utah 2008).
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made to all the jurors returned" and section § 19-2003 defines that panel as "a list of the
jurors returned by a sheriff to serve at a particular court or for the trial of a particular
action." I.C. §§ 19-2003, 19-2004. Therefore, § 19-2006 envisions a challenge to the
entire panel drawn.

Furthermore, the language "before a juror is sworn" seems to

indicate this type of challenge must be made prior to the jurors being sworn to conduct

voir dire, rather than prior to the jury panel being sworn. Compare I.C. § 19-2006 with
§ 19-2012 ("[l]f he intends to challenge an individual juror he must do so before the jury
is sworn."} and§ 19-2014 (explaining that a peremptory or for cause challenge "must be
taken before the jury is sworn to try the case."); See also§ 19-2013 (explaining the two
types of challenges to individual jurors). Finally, Idaho Code§ 19-2029 lists the order in
which challenges for cause must take place, noting a challenge to the entire panel, must
come before challenges for cause to individual jurors and Idaho Code § 19-2030
explains that after the panel has been passed for cause, the parties can make their
peremptory challenges. §§ 19-2029, 19-2030. Therefore, Mr. Erickson contends that
neither § 19-2006, nor any other section in title 19 chapter 20 of the Idaho Code, is
applicable to objections made to an opposing party's use of his peremptory challenges.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals' prior opinions in Ruybal and Yon are
distinguishable from the issue at hand. Ruybal dealt with a challenge to the selection
process of the entire panel that was raised for the first time on appeal. Ruybal, 102
Idaho at 887-88, 643 P.2d at 837-38. Yon involved an objection raised after the verdict
was given that the jury was prejudiced by statements made by one of the jurors during
voir dire. Yon, 115 Idaho at 909, 771 P.2d at 927. In fact, in Ruybal, the Court noted
that the applicable statutes related to challenging a jury panel because the venire was
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not selected properly, "contemplate that a party should use reasonable diligence in
asserting his rights" and that in Ruybal failing to raise the issue until appeal was not
reasonable diligence.

Ruybal, 102 Idaho at 887-88, 643 P.2d at 837-38.

Here,

Mr. Erickson did use reasonable diligence in asserting his rights, attempting to place his
objection on the record prior to the jury returning from their recess right after they were
sworn and before opening statements were given.
Therefore, Mr. Erickson contends that the Court of Appeals' Opinion in Hansen
should not apply in this case and this Court should not follow the reasoning articulated
by the Court of Appeals because the statutes and case law cited by the Court of
Appeals are not relevant to the inquiry at hand.

ii.

This Court Should Adopt A Standard That Allows Objections
Pursuant To Batson To Made Within A Reasonable Time

In United States v. Thompson, 827 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit
allowed an objection based on Batson to be heard immediately after the jury had been
sworn. 827 F.2d at 1257. In reaching its decision, the Court noted it was unpersuaded
that the objection had to be made prior to the jury being sworn stating, "the
prosecution's peremptory challenges might not have been apparent until the jury was
selected, so the objection could not...have been raised much earlier." Id. The court
also noted that the State suffered no prejudice from the delay. Id. Because it was the
defendant who moved for the mistrial, double jeopardy would not have barred retrial. Id.
Likewise, in United States v. Contreras-Contreras, 83 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1996), the
Ninth Circuit again reiterated "[tjhe case law is clear that a Batson objection must be
made as soon as possible, and preferably before the jury is sworn." 83 F.3d at 1104.
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See also Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 948 F.2d 532, 534 {9th Cir.1991) (stating, in a
wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress case, "that

Batson objections must occur as soon as possible, preferably before the jury is sworn").
The case at hand is very similar to Thompson. Although we don't know for sure
whether an objection was raised prior to the jury being sworn, a discussion was held off
the record while the peremptory challenges were being exercised. An objection was put
on the record, or attempted to be put on the record, after the jury was sworn, a break
was taken, and the court reconvened. At that time, counsel for Mr. Erickson explained
that he had an objection to make on the record, and that he did not want it to be waived.
The district court instructed that the matter would be taken up in the morning and the
issue would not be waived. At the very least, an objection was placed or attempted to
be place on the record as soon as there was an opportunity outside the presence of the
jury. Furthermore, what was placed on the record indicates that this was not the first
time the objection was brought up, but rather the first time it was placed on the record.
Therefore, Mr. Erickson urges this Court to adopt a similar standard to that in Thompson
and find that his objection was timely and should be considered on appeal.

b.

The State Waived Any Objection To The Timeliness
Mr. Erickson's Batson Challenge By Failing To Object Below

Of

Even if Mr. Erickson's Batson objection is considered untimely, it should still be
considered on appeal because the State failed to object to the timeliness below. Unlike

Hansen, where the State objected to the timeliness of the Batson challenge below, in
this case, when asked to respond the State never claimed that Mr. Erickson's challenge
was untimely. (Compare Trial Tr., p.40, L.19- p.42, L.2 with Hansen, 127 Idaho at 677,
904 P.2d at 947.)
21

Although this issue has never been addressed in Idaho, other jurisdictions have
required the opposing party to object to the timeliness of the Batson challenge below
before timeliness will be considered on appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that "just as a Batson challenge must be made timely or it will be rejected, an
objection to the timeliness of a Batson challenge must likewise be made timely or it will
be rejected. Garcia v. Excel Corp., 102 F.3d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1997). Similarly, the
Illinois Supreme Court has held that the opposing party must make an objection to the
timeliness of a Batson challenge below otherwise the issue is waived for appeal.
People v. Henderson, 142 111.2d 258, 283, 568 N.E. 2d 1234 (Ill. 1990) overruling on
grounds by People v. Terry, 182 111.2d 298, 700 N.E. 2d 992 (Ill. 1998); People v. Harris,

192111.2d 123,171,544 N.E. 2d 357,378 (1989); but see State v. Goldsby, 845 S.W.2d
636 (Mo.App. E.D. 1992) (rejecting appellant's argument that the State should not be
able to argue for the first time on appeal that appellant's Batson claim was untimely).
Requiring the party opposing the Batson challenge to raise timelienss below
would help prevent the situation at hand and provide notice to the defendant and the
district court that a record needs to be made regarding the timeliness of the challenge.
ff the State had objected to the timeliness below in this case, a record could have been
made regarding when defense counsel first raised this issue before the district court and
the district court could have made a finding regarding the timeliness. Furthermore, the
State's silence in this case could be because the objection was raised while the parties
were exercising their peremptory challenges off the record and the prosecutor knew an
objection had been properly made. Therefore, Mr. Erickson contends this Court should
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require that any objection to the timeliness of a party's Batson challenge must be made
by the opponent below, otherwise the challenge will be deemed timely on appeal.
c.

The State's Violation Of Mr. Erickson's Right To Equal Protection
By Removing Only Men From The Jury Should Be Reviewed For
Fundamental Error

Finally, Mr. Erickson contends that even if his Batson challenge is considered
untimely and the State did not have to .object to the timeliness below, the State's
violation of Mr. Erickson's right to equal protection under Batson and J.E.B. should still
be reviewed for fundamental error in this case. Fundamental error is error that goes to
the foundation or basis of the defendant's rights, the foundation of the case, or takes
from the defendant a right which is essential to his defense and which he cannot or
should not be permitted to waive. State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 677, 67 P.3d
1283, 1289 (2003) (noting the term "plain error" emobodies the concept of "fundamental
error" in the context of criminal cases).
Although no cases in Idaho have specifically addressed whether an untimely
Batson challenge can be reviewed for fundamental error, the Idaho Court of Appeals

has previously reviewed actions that occurred during the jury selections process for
fundamental error.

In State v. Yon, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed a juror's

remark during voir dire to determine whether the statement affected the deliberations of
the other jurors to such an extent as to deprive the defendant of a right to a fair trial.
Yon, at 909, 771 P.Zd at 927.

Mr. Erickson also encourages this Court to look to other jurisdictions which have
reviewed Batson violations for fundamental error as persuasive authority. In ContrerasContreras, the Ninth Circuit reviewed an untimely Batson challenge for "plain error." 83
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F.3d 1103. In that case the prosecutor volunteered to the district court that he intended
to strike two African-American jurors and his reasoning. Id. at 1104-05. Although the
defense did not object to these strikes or the reason offered for these strikes, the Ninth
Circuit reviewed the case for plain error, finding that the reasons offered by the State for
its peremptory challenges were not plain error. Id. Similarly, other federal circuits and
State courts have also applied plain error review absent a timely Batson objection. See
United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109 (ih Cir. 1998); Hidalgo v. Fagen, Inc., 206

F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Ballew, 76 Ohio St 3d 244, 253, 667 N.E.2d 369,
379 (Ohio 1996) (failing to raise Batson objection at trial, waived "all but plain error");
but see James v. Bowersox, 187 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 1999); State v. Holder, 155 Ariz. 83,

85, 745 P.2d 141, 143 (1987); Williams v. State, 773 S.W.2d 525 (Texas Crim. App.
1988).
Mr. Erickson contends the Batson violation in this case was clear from the record
and demonstrates fundamental error. When making his objection to the State's use of
its peremptory challenges, counsel for Mr. Erickson explained that the defense objected
to the disqualification of only males by the State. (Trial Tr., p.39, Ls.14-15. He went on
to explain:
We believe that violates-and I don't have the case right offhand,
but there was a Supreme Court case that said you cannot disqualify jurors
based solely on races [sic] and gender and sex and race. I think those
cases were race cases, but we think it applies equally to gender. We
notice that all the prempts by the State were males. Not one female
among the whole, and this is an exceptionally large amount of
prempts ....We have 10. They passed on one, so they ended up bumping
nine males ... by passing, why they actually did bump one female. And it
appears like it is a sex bias orientation of the jury, an attempt to
manipulate the jury in that fashion, and we would object based on the
State's selection in that regard.
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(Trial Tr., p.39, L.14 - p.40, L.6.) The district court then asked the State if it had a
response, to which it responded:
We have no response, your Honor. We just don't think that it's a
constitutional basis to declare a mistrial and start over. He cites no
authority. I am not aware of any authority. I think maybe the argument
would have some clarity and perhaps some status if we ended up with a
jury that was all female. And now we're looking at a jury that's
substantially all female. We got a jury here, as I recall, pretty much split
on gender lines. I think half of them are males and half of them are
females. We just simply exercise our prernpts as we determine based
upon the voir dires and based upon the questionnaire we felt best favored
the State. If that turned out to be males, that just simply because we
made that judgment that we didn't wind up with an all male jury, we
didn't end up with an all female jury.
We just felt we need a jury of parents and we kind of focused on
getting parents. We wanted some grandparents on there, but we didn't
really care whether they were fathers, mothers, grandmas, or
grandfathers. And the result would have been, Gee whiz, we got this
entire jury that's all males, or all females, then maybe... .But I don't
think there is a presumption that because somebody stuck all men or
struck all women that therefore we have a gender bias and prejudice
which is unconstitutional therefore we should start over.
(Trial Tr., p.40, L.19- p.42, L.2.) Counsel for Mr. Erickson again explained why he felt
that the State was excluding jurors based on their sex, explaining that there is a
grandmother testifying and two girls "and it's the State's obvious intent to try and get as
many females on the jury as possible." (Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.7-12.) He noted that if the
pool had been 50/50 to begin with, they probably would have ended up with an all
female jury; however, because the pool weighed in favor of men, they ended up with
roughly a 50/50 split. (Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.12-18.) He explained, "I can't see any other
obvious ground on which they can base [their preempts] on .... you wouldn't hit nine
out of 10 like that by mere happenchance, mere fortuity." (Trial Tr., p.42, Ls.19-25.)
Mr. Erickson clearly demonstrated an inference of a discriminatory purpose in the
State's peremptory challenges. See Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169. Additionally, the State
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offered no individualized gender-neutral explanation for its use of challenges. See id. at
169-71. The general explanation that was given indicates that gender was used in
determining which peremptory challenges to exercise, admitting that it exercised its
prempts in the manner that best favored the State and "[i]f it turned out to be males, that
just simply because we made that judgment that we didn't wind up with an all male jury,
we didn't end up with an all female jury." (Trial Tr., p.40, L.19 - p.42, L.2.) Therefore,
Mr. Erickson contends the State's discriminatory use of its peremptory challenges in this
case amounted to fundamental error.

2.

The District Court Erred When It Found That The State Did Not Use Its
Peremptory Challenges In A Discriminatory Manner To Exclude Only Men
From The Jury

Finally, if Mr. Erickson's Batson challenge is reviewed on appeal, Mr. Erickson
contends the district court erred when it found that the State did not use its peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner.

Prior to ruling on Mr. Erickson's Batson

challenge, The district court took the evening to read the case law. (Trial Tr., p.43, Ls.312.) The next morning, without further argument from counsel for Mr. Erickson or the
State, the district court denied the motion. (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.2-7, 14-15.) The district
court cited Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Arizona stating, "the problem I have with
both Batson and JEB is they are situations where the jury ended up being all of one
type. We don't have that in this situation." (Trial Tr., p.60, Ls.2-4.) The court explained
the jury consisted of eight men and five women and that the panel started out with 36
men and 28 women; therefore, he did not see any kind of "disproportionate percentage"
and was "not prepared to say that it's a discriminatory panel." (Trial Tr., p.60, Ls.2-9.)
Later the district court clarified the number of men and women on the jury stating there
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were actually seven men and six women serving on the jury. (Trial Tr., p.67, Ls.6-9.) In
making its ruling, the district court then cited State v. Owen, noting that in finding that a
white woman had the right to challenge the removal of two native Americans from the
jury, the court said she did and that "it wasn't her equal protection that was at issue, it
was the two Native Americans equal protection that was at issue." (Trial Tr., p.60,
Ls.10-19.) The district court went on to find that "[i]n this case, I don't believe that white
males are a protected class. So I don't think they have any constitutional issues to raise
by the fact that there was all men kicked off the jury." (Trial Tr., p.60, L.25 - p.61, L.3.)
The district court found that "there has not been a showing of discrimination by striking a
protected class from the jury panel, and so I'm going to deny the motion on that
ground." (Trial Tr., p.61, Ls.3-7.)
The district court's finding that white men are not a protected class and that this
case was distinguishable from Batson and J.E.B. because the panel did not consist of
all women were erroneous. As the United State's Supreme Court noted in J.E.B. each
juror has a right to be free from discrimination because of the their gender. 511 U.S. at
140. This right exists regardless of the final results of the panel and regardless of
whether it is only white men being challenged. See id generally.
Additionally, a correct application of the three part test articulated in Batson
demonstrates that Mr. Erickson clearly established a prima facia case of gender based
motivation by noting that the State only struck men with nine challenges. Although, the
jury panel itself favored men, this was only slight, with 36 men and 28 women, a 9:7
ratio. (Trial Tr., p.60, Ls.2-9.) Thus, the defense easily satisfied the first part of the
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inquiry, by demonstrating a prima facia case of gender discrimination based on the
State's using all nine of its challenges on men.
Second, the rationale offered by the State clearly indicates it had gender in mind
when it was at least making some of the peremptory challenges. (Trial Tr., p.40, L.19 p.42, L.2.) The State offered no individualized gender-neutral explanation for its use of
challenges and the general explanation that was given indicates that gender was used
in determining which peremptory challenges to exercise.

The State admitted that it

exercised its prempts in the manner that best favored the State and if that ended up
being against only men that was because the State did not want to have an all female
jury. (Trial Tr., p.40, L.19 - p.42, L.2.) As noble as it seems to try to make sure the jury
represents a cross-section of the community, if a prosecutor exercises his challenges
based upon a juror's gender or race he is violating the jurors' right to equal protection.
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140.

Therefore, the State's use of its peremptory challenges to eliminate only male
jurors from the jury pool was a clear violation of Batson, violating Mr. Erickson's and the
jurors' right to equal protection.

fl.

Mr. Erickson's Rights To Due Process And A Fair Trial Were Violated By The
Prosecutorial Misconduct Committed In This Case

A

Introduction
In this case, the prosecutor's misconduct, which began during the prosecutor's

opening statements, continued while he was questioning witnesses, and reached its
peak during closing arguments, deprived Mr. Erickson of his right to a fair trial and his
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right to due process of law. See U.S. Const. amends VI, XIV; Idaho Const., art. I§ 13.
The State's case hinged on the testimony of the alleged victims in this case, and the
credibility of their accusations of sexual misconduct against Mr. Erickson. Based on
these allegations, Mr. Erickson was convicted of two counts of sexual abuse of a minor.
Unfortunately, the State's misconduct throughout the trial and closing arguments
contributed to this conviction.
During trial, the prosecutor was allowed to introduce facts not in evidence, over
objection. The prosecutor also ignored the district court's ruling that bad act evidence
related to Mr. Erickson's drug use must be taken up outside the presence of the jury
before it could be brought in.

Furthermore, the opening and closing statements

included many instances of prosecutorial misconduct, including vouching, again
referring to information not in evidence, misstating or attempting to shift the burden of
proof, and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury.

8

Therefore,

Mr. Erickson contends that this repeated and extensive misconduct deprived him of his
right to a fair trial and his conviction should be reversed.

B.

Standard Of Review
Prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional principles;

therefore, they involve questions of law over which the appellate court exercises free
review. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 273, 77 P.3d 956, 962 (2003) ("Constitutional
issues ... are questions of law over which this Court exercised free review.").

8

Mr. Erickson has attached the prosecutor's opening and closing arguments as an
Appendix for ease of the court's review. (See Appendix.)
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C.

Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Committed Throughout Mr. Erickson's Trial,
Denying Mr. Erickson Of His Rights To Due Process And A Fair Trial
When a contemporaneous objection has been made to the prosecutor's

misconduct, the appellate court will determine factually if misconduct has occurred, and
if so, whether the misconduct was harmless. Stat/3 v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165
P.3d 273, 285 (2007). Absent an objection below, prosecutorial misconduct will only be
reviewed for fundamental error.

Id.

Idaho Courts have noted that when reviewing

fundamental error, each case will "stand on its own merits" and "[o]ut of the facts in
each case will arise the law." State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 470, 163 P.3d
1175, 1182 (2007) (quoting State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,423, 776 P.2d 424 432
(1989)).
Therefore, when reviewing the objected to misconduct, this Court must determine
whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred and whether it was harmless. Field, 122
Idaho at 571, 165 P.3d at 285. When reviewing misconduct that was not objected to,
this Court must first determine whether it was fundamental error. Id. A fundamental
error is one that '"so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and
deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process."' Christiansen at 470,
163 P.2d at 1182 (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970
(2003); State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991)). It has been
defined as an error which "goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or. .. to
the foundation of the case or take[s] from the defendant a right which was essential to
his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive." Id. (quoting
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,423, 776 P.2d 424,432 (1989)).
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Here, the only objected to misconduct occurred during the course of trial when
the prosecutor questioned Tammy Erickson regarding information not in evidence, and
when the prosecutor violated the district court's prior ruling that bad act evidence must
be taken up outside of the jury before it could be admitted. Additionally, the numerous
instance of prosecutorial misconduct in the opening and closing arguments, although
not objected to, arise to fundamental error.

1.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Argued Facts Not In
Evidence Over Objection And When He Again Referred To These "Facts"
In Closing Argument

It is improper for the prosecutor to refer to or place before the jury facts not in
evidence. State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166, 610 P.2d 522, 525 {1980) overruled on
other grounds by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387,630 P.2d 647; State v. Phillips, 144

Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587.

Here, while questioning Tammy Erickson on rebuttal

about Mr. Erickson telling her that the charges have been dropped because of lack of
evidence, the prosecutor asked Tammy Erickson, "So you were unaware that the
sheriff's office simply had lost that file and had not proceeded?" (Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.1014.) Counsel for Mr. Erickson immediately objected, stating that this was hearsay and
was submitting or assuming facts not in evidence. {Trial Tr., p. 459, Ls.10-14.) The
district court stated that it was not a statement and allowed the question to be
answered, thereby overruling the objection. {Trial Tr., p.459, Ls.15-18.) However, no
evidence had ever been presented by either party that the sheriff's office has lost the file
and that is why they did not proceed on charges in this case.
This same evidence was also referred to by the State in both its opening and
closing statements; although no testimony was presented. In the opening statements,
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the prosecutor argued, "You are seeing these children years after the incident. Some of
that because they didn't report it timely, some of that burden falls upon us." (Trial
Tr., p.26, Ls.22-25 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor went on to explain:
They contacted our law enforcement sheriff's office and the deputy
that was assigned to that simply dropped it, stood there for more than
three years. When they inquired what had become of it, it got turned over
to Deputy Marinez. Martinez contacted my office and three years later we
start trying to locate these victims. Try to re-interview them, trying to talk
to them. Trying to go back. That was our mistake. Believe me, I have
apologized to them. I've apologized to the parents and loved ones. It
should not have happened, but it did happen.
(Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.4-15.).
However, Deputy Martinez was never called as a witness and the State never
attempted to put this information into evidence. (See Trial Tr., Index pp.A-C.) The only
witnesses who were called by the State were the L.H., C.E., their grandmother
Ms. Snow, the State's expert Ms. Yeager and, on rebuttal, the victim's mother Tammy
Erickson, none of whom would have information or incite into why law enforcement or
the prosecutor's office failed to bring charges in this case. (See Trial Tr., Index pp.A-C;
Trial Tr., generally.)
In his rebuttal argument during closing, the prosecutor again referred to the late
filing of charges stating:
I understand we had to bring this case up almost three years after
[the reporting to Bright Tomorrow]. In some respects the report is not
really that late, it's just that we dropped the ball and didn't get it and I told
you that in the beginning. Do not blame the children for that. He was
trying to make something out of that. Well, they brought it up in 2004 and
then it was dropped and then they bring it back up again in 2006 because
she's gone back in for some more rehab. We dropped the ball. That's
just the gravel and the straw. It's just not true. They brought it up.
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(Trial Tr., p.520, L.23 - p.521, L.9.) However, this time no objection was made to this
statement.
Mr. Erickson contends that the district court erred in failing to sustain his
objection when Tammy Erickson was asked whether she was aware the Sheriff's file
was lost and that is why charges had not proceeded. Furthermore, the prosecutor's
reference to this again in closing argument constitutes fundamental error.

2.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Violated The District
Court's Ruling That Bad Act Evidence Related To Mr. Erickson's Drug Use
Or Drug Possession Had To Be Taken Up Outside Of The Jury For A
Ruling By The Court Before It Came In

The prosecutor also committed misconduct when he attempted to solicit
testimony regarding Mr. Erickson's drug use or drug possession, without first obtaining
a ruling, outside the presence of the jury, whether this information was admissible. In
State v. Field, the Idaho Supreme Court found that it was misconduct for the prosecutor

to question a witness about evidence that the State had promised to speak to the judge
about, outside the presence of the jury, to determine its admissibility before offering into
evidence. Field, 144 Idaho at 572, 165 P.3d at 286. See also State v. Agundis, 127
Idaho 587, 596-97, 903 P.2d 752, 761-62 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding it is prosecutorial
misconduct when the prosecutor intentionally disregards district court's ruling that
testimony is inadmissible hearsay and attempts to elicit hearsay indirectly).
Similarly here, the district court had specifically ruled prior to trial that "[a]ny
evidence of Defendant's criminal acts of bad acts pertaining to illegal drugs or controlled
substances shall not be presented to the jury by an attorney or witness without the
necessary hearing outside the presence of the jury." (R., p.184.) Despite this ruling,
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while cross-examining Glade Erickson, Mr. Erickson's father about Glade Erickson
telling Tammy Erickson she could have the truck following Mr. Erickson's arrest on
these charges, the prosecutor asked, "Do you know whether or not there were anywere there any illegal substances found in that truck?" at which point the defense
objected and a discussion was held outside the presence of the jury. (Trial Tr., p.269,
Ls.4-20.)

Defense counsel explained that the State was attempting to introduce

evidence of the drug offense, which under the plea agreement in that case as well as
the district court's prior ruling, was not to be referenced. (Trial Tr., p.369, L.23 - p.370,
L.2.) The State explained that they were trying to use this information to demonstrate
there might have been an ulterior motive to turning the truck over to Tammy because it
might have been "hot with drugs" to set Tammy up. (Trial Tr., p.373, Ls.2-9.) The court
sustained the defense objection, noting that the door had not been opened to the
State's theory just by Glade's testimony. (Trial Tr., p.378, Ls.13-20.)
Although the objection was sustained in this case and the testimony was not
allowed in, it was still misconduct for the State to violate the district court's order that
this evidence would not come in absent a hearing and determination outside the
presence of the jury. Furthermore, most people watching this exchange would infer that
illegal substances were likely found in the truck, even if the objection was sustained and
the question was not answered. Presumably this is the very reason why the district
court wanted matters related to the drug charges taken up outside the presence of the
jury. Therefore, it was misconduct for the prosecutor to ask this question without first
seeking permission to do so outside the presence of the jury.

34

3.

The Prosecutor Committed Numerous Instances Of Misconduct During
His Opening And Closing Arguments Resulting In Fundamental Error

During both opening and closing statements, the prosecutor vouched for the
believability of his witnesses and expressed his opinion that he did not believe the
defense witnesses. During closing arguments the State also referred to information not
in evidence, impermissibly tried to misstate or shift the burden of proof to the defense,
and repeatedly appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury, urging the jury to
convict Mr. Erickson based on emotional appeals and placing themselves in the alleged
victims shoes, rather than on the evidence. Therefore, Mr. Erickson contends that this
repeated and extensive misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial and his
conviction should be reversed.
a.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Repeatedly
Vouched For The State's Witnesses And Against The Defense
Witnesses

The prosecutor committed misconduct when he repeatedly vouched for the
State's witnesses and commented on the lack of credibility of defense witnesses.
Although the prosecutor is given considerable latitude in his argument and can
permissibly discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising from the
evidence, the prosecutor should not express his personal opinion or beliefs regarding
the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. Phi/lips, 144 Idaho
at 86, 153 P.3d at 587; State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114
(Ct. App. 2003). Two dangers are presented by a prosecutor's vouching for a witness.
United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142, 1147-1148 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting
U.S.

v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1986)). Vouching can "convey the impression that
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evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, supports the charges
against the defendant" jeopardizing the defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. Furthermore,
"the prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may
induce the jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the
evidence." Id. '"Vouching for a government witness in closing argument has often been
held to be plain error, reviewable even though no objection was raised."' Frederick, 78
F.3d 1370, 1379 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 534
(9th Cir. 1980)
Throughout his arguments the prosecutor repeatedly vouched for the alleged
victims in this case, referring to his belief in their testimony and credibility.

The

prosecutor's vouching began in his opening statement after he described L.H. and C.E.
as "damaged children" when he stated:
So I guess when you look at your common experiences, and I
always call on juries, kind of look at common experiences. This is
probably one of the exceptions. You just have not seen the damaged
goods trying to recollect and tell you what happened. They are subject to
cross-examination. They are subject to speculation. What I'm going to
tell you is I don't believe children under these circumstances are
going to lie to you. I think you will find the truth.'
(Trial Tr., p.27, L.23 - p.28, L.6; see also Trial Tr., p.25, L.23 - p.26, L.16 (emphasis
added).)
The prosecutor's vouching continued throughout his closing and rebuttal
arguments. Shortly into his closing the prosecutor explained:
You heard a lot of testimony from experts. I'm not convinced that
experts always help us. I think sometimes you just simply believe a [L.H.],
you believe a [C.E.J, or you just don't believe them. I believe their
stories-I believe that their testimony is very credible.
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(Trial Tr., p.479, Ls.2-8 (emphasis added).) The prosecutor also argued that C.E. would
not lie to the jury stating:
People lie for motives, for reasons. I suggest to you she's telling
you the exact truth. Do not find her story not credible because she initially
denied it to a strange police officer. She told it in Bright Tomorrow. She
told the story in the preliminary hearing. She told her story here. There is
not recanting of it. Oh, we can talk about locations, times, but she was
pretty detailed, wasn't she?
(Trial Tr., p.482, Ls.11-17.) Later, when referring to discrepancies in L.H.'s testimony
the prosecutor stated:
Is she confused? I think one time she told the officer it was her
breast, it was underneath her pants, panties it was on the outside. She
couldn't remember for sure. She thought they were both on the outside
when she testified. Does that mean she's not believable? Absolutely
not.
(Trial Tr., p.484, Ls.7-12 (emphasis added).)
After analogizing his expert and the defense expert to learning to farm from
someone who has ranched with his father and grandfather vs. someone "who went to
school, got a doctor's degree and read about it," the prosecutor then explained that the
defense expert would set a standard that would make it impossible to prosecute anyone
and not to let his testimony persuade them into thinking this case was weak.
prosecutor stated:
Don't let them persuade you that this is a weak case because
we're not doing what their expert thought we should do. It's a strong
case because these witnesses, [L.H.] and [C.E.], are believable. And
they took a lot of shots at them, a lot of cross-examination, a lot of anger,
hard to control. It came out in chunks and bites. She should be angry. I
understand her anger. Don't judge her because she showed emotion or
anger. She should show that. If that helps her heal, helps her get by it,
then she should show it. Don't use that as a reason not to believe her.
Don't use the expert. Ah ha, it's possible, it's possible, it's possible.

(Trial Tr., p.484, L.25- p.486, L.18 (emphasis added).)
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The

Later when again referring to L.H.'s testimony, the prosecutor stated:
At times I think. I thought she was very believable. If you cannot
believe two of them saying their father started the same thing about the
same age, 10 and 11, what would you do if you just had one? Sometimes
we do. This case for you jurors is somewhat easier, not totally, but
somewhat easier than if you had one child talking about it.
Here there is a pattern. Here there is a history. But not as
Dr. Rybicki said to imply a negative or false reporting, but the history when
you look at it, the uncles that have abused children within this family. I
think they're believable. I think they're very believable. And I think
when you hear their testimony it just-just put yourself there a little bit.
What was to be going through a child's mind when they're put in this
situation? It did happen.
(Trial Tr., p.491, L.21 - p.492, L.12 (emphasis added).)
In addition to vouching for L.H. and C.E., the prosecutor also vouched for L.H.
and C.E.'s' mother, Tammy Erickson, who was called as a defense witness and later
called by the State as a rebuttal witness. The prosecutor commented that, "l thought
she was a pretty good mom." (Trial Tr., p.492, Ls.17-18.) Later, the prosecutor stated,
"l thought she showed remarkable control. I didn't see I thought this raging maniac who
was willing to use the kids to get back at him. I mean, that's the defense in part. That's
a fantasy world." (Trial Tr., p.492, L.21 - p.493, L.8.)
In addition to vouching for his own witnesses, the prosecutor also vouched
against or commented on the defense witnesses' lack of credibility. In rebuttal, after
explaining to the jury that if they do not believe the girls' testimony they must acquit the
defendant and if they do believe the girls' testimony they must convict the defendant,
the prosecutor stated, "I think they're believable. I can look at some of the defense
witnesses", and then goes on to compare the testimony of Janette Erickson with her son
stating that their statements are "not even close. It's not believable." (Trial Tr., p.523,
L.23 - p.525, L.4.)
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The prosecutor also vouched for his own case and irnpermissibly commented on
his belief in the defendant's guilt or innocence. In speaking about the fact that this case
involved a divorce, the State again tried to vouch for the witnesses and place the
prestige of its office behind its decision to prosecute stating:
I would tell you that we do look at that as prosecutors and police
officers when we got divorces and custody battles and we get these
allegations. We know from our experiences, we know from Dr. Mydell
Yeager's people, let's look at that. Don't turn a blind eye to it. That's not
news to me. That's not new to me. We look at it very carefully. To
suggest we just don't look at it is just not true. I've been here too long.
I've seen too many cases. I look at it.
But I've got two saying it, not just one. We have one family
member, same age group complaining about the uncle, the grandfather, in
this case the father. Who else did you have access to, they complained,
no problems, another red flag. Huh, do I go forth on this? You know,
serious charges. You want to make sure you look at them before you at
least do prosecution.
(Trial Tr., p.488, L.11 - p.489, L.2.)

In addition to vouching for the witnesses, the

prosecutor is also vouching for his decision to prosecute the case.

Basically he is

saying I looked at this case and considered everything and I would not be prosecuting
this defendant unless I though he was guilty, which encourages the jury to convict the
defendant based on the prosecutor's decision to prosecute, rather than the evidence at
hand. See Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1147-1148.
The prosecutor's repeated expressions regarding the believability of its witnesses
and the lack of believability of the defense witnesses, as well as his statements
regarding his own decision to the prosecute this case, were impermissible attempts to
vouch for the credibility of his case and his witnesses and against the defense
witnesses. This vouching was so prevalent throughout the prosecutor's arguments that
it deprived Mr. Erickson of a fair trial resulting in fundamental error.
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b.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He Referred To
Facts That Was Not Presented As Evidence At Trial

As argued above is section ll(C)(1), and incorporated herein by reference, it is
improper for the prosecutor to argue facts not in evidence during closing arguments.
See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. In addition to referring to why the State

failed to pursue charges in this case for several years as argued above in section
ll(C)(1), during closing argument, the prosecutor also presented evidence regarding
custody laws in Idaho arguing stating:
There is really no custody battle here. This is when we have
custody battles. There is no custody battle here. They're trying to
convince you and make-believe there is a custody battle. Oh, gee whiz,
mom moved out and he's over at Audra Bell's on all the weekends. Good
heavens. He's got a job. He's got money. Now these guys just show up,
hey, I want my shared custody. Idaho is a 50/50 state. Unless you're
proved to be an unfit parent, you get shared custody of your kids, joint
custody, legal and physical. Been the law for a long time. Pretty easy.
And mom's taking these kids and not letting you visit. That's a pretty easy
remedy. At least he's got a job and he's got some money. Her remedy
might be more difficult because of her financial situation circumstances,
but he's got an easy remedy. Just walks into court unless mom can prove
he's unfit. That's what the law says. I don't think there was a custody
issue. They never went to court. Never any custody battle here. There is
as of a week ago.
(Trial Tr., p.515, L.18 - p.516, L.12.) Again no evidence regarding the custody laws of
Idaho were submitted during trial and even if the State had tried to introduce such
evidence, it would have likely not been allowed in because it would be irrelevant to the
case at hand. Therefore, the State clearly argued information that was not presented to
the jury below.
Furthermore, by these statements the prosecutor was trying appeal to the jury's
emotions, noting that Mr. Erickson could seek custody if he wanted it, leaving the jury
with the impression he does not even want custody of his children or want to pursue it.
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(See section lll(C)(3)(d) below for a discussion and case law regarding appeals to

passions and prejudices). The affect of the argument is to focus the jury on information
outside of the record and judge the credibility of the witnesses based on that
information, rather than to focus the jury on the evidence presented at trial. Therefore,
Mr. Erickson contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he referred to
facts not in evidence during his closing arguments.

c.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When He lmpermissibly
Misstated The Burden Of Proof, Implying The Jury Was To
Determine What Burden Of Proof Was Appropriate

It is also prosecutoria! misconduct for a prosecutor to misstate the law or the
reasonable doubt standard in closing arguments. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86,
156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Jdaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d

596, 607 (1993).

See also State v. Miles, 139 Wash.App. 879, 162 P.3d 1169

(Wash.App.Div.2. 2007) ("Although prosecutors have "wide latitude" to make inferences
about witness credibility, it is flagrant misconduct to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant.")

It is the State's burden to prove each element of its case beyond a

reasonable doubt and the defendant has no duty to present any evidence. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

At the beginning of his closing argument, while thanking the jury for its service,
the prosecutor explained how important it is that "we have people willing to sacrifice
their time" to serve on the jury and stated:
We need the moms and dads, the grandpas, the sons and
daughters who live on Main Street to take a look at what we do as
lawyers, what we do as prosecutors, what we do as judges and tell us,
communicate with us, on what these cases are and what it takes for
the State to make this case.
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(Trial Tr., p.475, Ls.15-10 (emphasis added).) Later, at the end of his rebuttal, the
prosecutor again returned to this theme of the jury setting the standard for determining
the burden of proof, although this time more egregiously shifting or misstating the
burden of proof when stating:
I just think the bottom line is this, it's our communities and our families, our
children. We have the legal, moral, ethic obligation to protect them. You
set a standard for myself as prosecutor. You set the standard for law
enforcement. We look at these cases very carefully. What is the
standard in Bear Lake County by a jury on what they're going to
accept as proof of child molestation? That's all it's about.
(Trial Tr., p.526, Ls.9-13 (emphasis added).) This statement is calling on the jury to
look not at the law regarding burden of proof, but their own emotional responses, to
determine for themselves based on their visceral reaction whether the defendant is
guilty, shifting or misstating the burden of proof.
By shifting or misstating the burden of proof required to convict Mr. Erickson, the
prosecutor committed misconduct by encouraging the jury to convict Mr. Erickson based
on what they believed was adequate proof, rather than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.

d.

The Prosecutor lmpermissibly Appealed To The Jury's Emotions
During The Closing Arguments

Throughout his closing arguments, the prosecutor also tried to appeal to the
emotions, passions, or prejudices of the jury by the use of inflammatory tactics designed
to place the jury in the shoes of the "victim" and by arguing the jury should convict
Mr. Erickson to serve justice. See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 587-588. It is improper for a
prosecutor to urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant by appealing "to the passions,
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fears and vulnerabilities of the jury." Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1149. This includes
urging a conviction to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future
lawbreaking. Id. The problem with appeals to emotion is that it encourages the jury to
convict the defendant based on reasons entirely separate from his own guilt or
innocence. Id. See also Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588 ("Nothing should
tempt [the prosecutor] to appeal to prejudices, to pervert the testimony, or make
statements to the jury, which whether true or not, have not been proved.").
The prosecutor is not permitted ask the jury to place themselves or their family
members in the place of the victim. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 554, 559, 816 P.2d
1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991). However, throughout his closing arguments, the prosecutor
encouraged the jury to place themselves in shoes of the alleged victims in this case.
When talking about C.E. initially denying that her father had ever touched her
inappropriately, the State asked the jury to place themselves in C.E.'s shoes stating:
I think she was about 13 or 14 when she was confronted with this.
You just-what would you say? You use your common sense. Put
yourself in that position. What would you say? Even if you had been
abused and somebody out of the clear blue just knocks on the door and
asks about your father, you would probably deny it.
You would then go to a person you trust. Mom's not there,
grandma is. You might start your disclosure then. I don't find that unusual
at all. I don't find that justification for not believing what C.E. told us.
Does that now mean-I mean, what is her motive for getting up and lying
under oath about what her father did to her? Why in the world would C.E.
lie in that situation? Ask yourself that. Why would that girl lie in that
situation? Because if she's telling the truth, he's guilty. The only way he's
not guilty is you have to accept she decided to get up and lie to us all.
(Trial Tr., p.481, l.17 - p.482, L.10 (emphasis added).) Shortly after this the prosecutor
recalled how C.E. cried while explaining where Mr. Erickson had alleged touched her
and tried to put the jury in shoes of the alleged victims' family stating, "Would any of you
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not believe this is lewd and lascivious, this is not sexual battery of a minor? Would you
allow your daughters and your granddaughters? None of us would. We would be irate?"
(Trial Tr., p.483, Ls.3-7.)
Later in his closing, the prosecutor stated:
Think about your own experiences. Think about your childhoods.
Think about your roles as parents, grandparents. You know, how would
you feel? How would you feel knowing that your testimony might
put your father through that, somebody you love. I find it pretty
common. I don't find that extraordinary. I don't find that for a reason not
to believe her. It gives her credibility. It's emotional. It's real. It adds to
that credibility.
What is that child going to do now? You know, I got away from it
and now I'm kind of back in it again a few months later, six or seven
months later.
You are probably going to think about telling
somebody. You might go in with your friend to talk to the resource
officer... and my stepdad is touching me inappropriately and I'm
uncomfortable with the way he touches me. You might ring the bell.
(Trial Tr., p.489, Ls.15-23, p.490, Ls.2-10 (emphasis added).)

Shortly after this

statement, the prosecutor again stated, "just put yourself there a little bit. What was to
be going through a child's mind when they're put in this situation? It did happen". (Trial
Tr., p.492, Ls.9-12.)
By asking the jury to place themselves in the shoes of the alleged victims several
times throughout closing arguments, the prosecutor was appealing to the passions and
prejudices of the jury. Such an appeal poses as significant risk that the jury convicted
Mr. Erickson not based on the evidence, but their emotions.
Finally, the prosecutor appealed to the emotions of the jury when he urged them
to convict Mr. Erickson to protect the community and to serve justice, commenting that
there is a downside to acquitting Mr. Erickson. When closing his rebuttal arguments the
prosecutor stated:
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I just think the bottom line is this, it's our communities and our
families, our children. We have the legal, moral, ethic obligation to
protect them. You set the standard for myself as prosecutor. You set
the standard for law enforcement. We look at these cases very carefully.
What is the standard in Bear Lake County by a jury on what they're going
to accept as proof of child molestation? That's all it's about.
And if your saying, Mr. [prosecutor], L.H., C.E., Officer
Martinez, it's just not there, I've got to have more than this, we
understand that, but there is also a downside to it. I can't bring the
perfect case. There will always be the possibility there. I bring you two
people molested by their father at pretty much the same age. One gives
credibility to the other. One collaborates the other. The pattern is similar.
Circumstances are similar. You as a juror are saying I don't believe either
one of them.
Ladies and gentlemen, I tell you this is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Justice demands that this father, this defendant, be convicted.
What he breached, the trust he breached, cannot happen without
consequences. The trust he breached as a parent to his daughters
cannot happen without consequences. You must convict him to serve
justice. A conviction of guilty is justice in this case.
(Trial Tr., p.526, L.25 - p.527, L.6 (emphasis added).)

In addition to the vouching

described in section ll(C){3)(a) and the attempts to shift the burden of proof described
above in section ll(C)(3)(c), this passage calls on the jury to convict Mr. Erickson to
protect community values and to serve justice. Although normally justice would be what
the law requires the jury to find, by previously mischaracterizing the jury's role into
determining what standard of proof the prosecutor needed to set forth and implying that
there are consequences to an acquittal, this statement furthered the misconduct that
had already occurred in the prosecutor's previous statements and encouraged the jury
to convict Mr. Erickson based on a sense of community justice rather than the evidence
that was before the jury.
Therefore, Mr. Erickson contends the State impermissibly appealed to the
passion and prejudices of the jury by encouraging them to place themselves in the
shoes of the alleged victims and their families and by asking them to convict
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Mr. Erickson to protect community values and to serve justice, the prosecutor
committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error.

e.

The Prosecutor's Repeated Misconduct So Infected The Trial In
Mr. Erickson's Case, That Even If Each Episode Of Misconduct By
Itself Did Not Rise To Fundamental Error, When Viewed
Cumulatively, The Misconduct Constituted Fundamental Error

Even if this Court finds that each episode of prosecutorial misconduct did not
amount to fundamental error by itself, the prosecutor's conduct when viewed
cumulatively, did amount to fundamental error, depriving Mr. Erickson of his right to a
fair trial. In State v. Gross, the Idaho Court of Appeals reviewed the cumulative affect of
the State's improper comments when determining whether fundamental error occurred.
146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (2008). In doing so the Court noted that under the
cumulative error doctrine, the accumulation of irregularities which by themselves may
be harmless, when aggregated demonstrate the absence of a fair trial, violating the
defendant's right to due process. Id. (citing State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965
P.2d 174, 183 (1998).

Likewise, here, even if each instance of unobjected to

prosecutorial misconduct did not deprive Mr. Erickson of his right to a fair trial, the
cumulative affect of the prosecutor's misconduct in this case did deprive Mr. Erickson of
his right to a fair trial, thereby establishing fundamental error.
D.

The Episodes Of Prosecutorial Misconduct In This Case Do Not Amount To
Harmless Error, Either Individually Or Cumulatively
The numerous improper statements by the prosecutor each individually, or

alternatively, viewed as whole, cannot be harmless. See State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15,
21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 37 P.3d 1
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(Ct. App. 2001) (holding that under the doctrine of cumulative error, the "accumulation
of irregularities, each of which in itself might be harmless, may in the aggregate show
the absence of a fair trial.") "Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). In State v.
Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346, 509 P.2d 331 (1973), the Idaho Supreme Court, when

reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, quoted the language of the United States
Supreme Court which found:
'The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party
to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a
case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and
very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike
hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one.'
Id. at 353-354, 509 P.2d at 338, 339 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88

(1935) (emphasis added)).
Here it simply cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the misconduct of
the prosecutor in this case did not contribute to Mr. Erickson's conviction. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); State

v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507, 616 P.2d 1034,

1043 (1980). Much of this case hinged on whether the jurors believed the testimony of
the alleged victims, L.H. and C.E ..
At trial, evidence was presented that L.H. and C.E. had given inconsistent
statements and had not been completely truthful with Detective Vollmer during the initial

47

investigation into these charges. C.E. admitted that when she was initially questioned,
she denied that her father had touched her inappropriately and that she had lied to the
officer when questioned. (Trial Tr., p.95, Ls.14-22.) When asked if Mr. Erickson was
still living with her at Ms. Snow's in 2004, C.E. testified that he had moved out. (Trial
Tr., p.91, Ls.8-10.) However, when she was questioned on cross-examination about
reporting to Tony Vollmer that he was still living with them in April 2004, she agreed that
he was living with her in 2004, although she did not remember this and this could have
been a lie. (Trial Tr., p.91, L.8 - p.92, L.7, p.100, Ls.16-21.) Furthermore, when she
testified at the preliminary hearing, she testified that the alleged incident with
Mr. Erickson occurred in July 2004, but at trial she testified that the event actually
occurred around the end of March 2004.

(Trial Tr., p.83, L.4 - p.84, L. 12, p.88,

L.4 - p.89, L.23.)
L.H. could not remember much of what allegedly happened, including how old
she was at the time of the alleged incident after school. (Trial Tr., p.112, L.25 - p.113,
L.1.) L.H. also admitted that she had told officers in Pocatello that Mr. Erickson had
been arrested and she didn't have a problem anymore, stating she lied to the officers
because she wanted it all to go away. (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.15-22.) The defense also
admitted Defense Exhibit 1, which was a letter L.H. wrote to her father stating that she
wished she had never made these statements and that it was just something that had
come out of her mouth. (Trial Tr., p.127, L.10 - p. 130, L.6.) Defense counsel also
asked L.H. if she remembered testifying differently at the preliminary hearing, stating
that the first alleged incident after school happened in 2001, the second alleged incident
in the trailer happened in 2002, and the third alleged incident happened in 2003 in
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Pocatello. (Trial Tr., p.131, L.25 - p.133, L.20.) L.H. stated, "[w]hether the time line is
right or not, I don't know." (Trial Tr., p.133, Ls.22-23.)
Detective Vollmer testified that L.H. had stated that no touching ever occurred in
Pocatello and that Mr. Erickson had not touched her any other times. (Trial Tr., p.393,
Ls.1-19.) L.H. also told detective Vollmer that Mr. Erickson was in jail, although he was
not. (Trial Tr., p.391, Ls.9-24.) L.H. told the detective that Mr. Erickson had moved out
of Ms. Snow's home and that he had moved his stuff back to Bear Lake.

(Trial

Tr., p.392, Ls.10-16.) Detective Vollmer also testified that when she interviewed C.E.,
C.E. denied that Mr. Erickson had every touched her inappropriately. (Trial Tr., p.394,
L.18 - p.396, L.9.) C.E. also told Detective Vollmer that Mr. Erickson was currently
living with them and that she had seen him the night prior to the interview.

(Trial

Tr., p.394, Ls.6-17.)
Defense witnesses also testified that L.H. had made statements regarding the
case indicating that the allegations were false. Janette Erickson, Mr. Erickson's sisterin-law testified that after she told L.H. she should go see her Grandma Rose,
Mr. Erickson's Grandmother, because she had been diagnosed with a brain tumor, L.H.
explained that she could not go over there "because of all the stuff that was going on"
later referring to it as "all the bullshit that's going on" and that L.H. stated that "she was
just sick of it and it was just a bunch of lies." (Trial Tr., p.331, l.22 - p.332, l.8, p.333,
L.18 - p.334, L.14.) Larry Erickson, Janette Erickson's son and Mr. Erickson's nephew,
testified that he had overheard this conversation and that L.H. said she could not go
visit grandma Rose and then stated, "just tell Scott not to worry about anything because
nothing happened." (Trial Tr., p.339, L.21 - p.341, L.25.) He testified that he did not
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recall anything else L.H. had said during the conversation. (Trial Tr., p.342, Ls.1-6.)
Melissa Lish, Mr. Erickson's niece, testified that L.H. had told her that she had made
these allegations because one of her friends had and that Mr. Erickson did not do
anything. (Trial Tr., p.343, Ls.4-20, p.345, Ls.12-23.)
Additionally, the defense presented witnesses who explained that the relationship
between Mr. Erickson, his ex-wife and the children had been tumultuous at times.
Marianne Hess, the step-mother of Mr. Erickson's nieces, testified that on one occasion
she had gone to Tammy's house to pick up her step-daughter and that Tammy and the
children were extremely upset with Mr. Erickson regarding the dispute over the vehicles
and that Tammy told Ms. Hess that "she would do anything to get [Mr. Erickson] locked
up or thrown in prison." (Trial Tr., p.318, L.9 - p.319, L.22, p.321, L. 13 - p.322, L.3.)
Likewise, Tammy Erickson admitted that when her and Mr. Erickson separated
that she was angry with Mr. Erickson, that she accused him of stalking her and putting a
bug in her car. (Trial Tr., p.309, Ls.12-20.) She also admitted that the children believed
that Mr. Erickson was the one who had turned her into police for her drug problem,
which resulted in her going on retained jurisdiction in 2004.

(Trial Tr., p.306,

L.13-p.307, L.6, p.309, L.24- p.310, L.3.)
C.E. also admitted that she was mad at her father prior to reporting these
allegations. (Trial Tr. p.92, Ls.14-15, p.98, Ls.9-21.) When her mother separated from
Mr. Erickson, her mother was very angry at him and C.E.'s family had told her that
Mr. Erickson was stalking her father.

(Trial Tr., p.92, L.16 - p.93, L.10.)

In the

interview with Bright Tomorrrows, C.E. told the interviewer that she thought Mr. Erickson
had put a bug in her mother's car. (Trial Tr., p.93, Ls.3-6.) L.H. also admitted that when
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asked if Mr. Erickson was her step-father, she had responded "unfortunately," although
she stated she was not bringing this up because of anger toward Mr. Erickson. (Trial
Tr., p.138, L.25 - p.139, L.2.)
Given the disputed nature of the allegations and the contradicting testimony and
statements, it is highly likely that the prosecutor's misconduct contributed to
Mr. Erickson's conviction. Therefore, the error in this case is not harmless.

Ill.
Mr. Erickson's Right To Due Process And Right To Be Free From Self Incrimination
Were Violated When The State Elicited Testimony From Detective Vollmer That
Mr. Erickson Refused To Corne In For An Interview
A.

Introduction
Mr. Erickson asserts that his rights to due process and to be free from self

incrimination, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, were violated when the
prosecutor used his pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to infer his guilty. During the crossexamination of Detective Vollmer, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the detective
indicating that Mr. Erickson failed to meet with her and refused to be interviewed by her
regarding the accusations in this case.
B.

Mr. Erickson's Due Process Rights Were Violated When The State Elicited
Testimony From Detective Vollmer That Mr. Erickson Refused To Be Interviewed
Regarding The Accusations
Mr. Erickson asserts that his due process rights, protected by the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I,§ 13 of
the Idaho Constitution, were violated when the prosecutor elicited testimony from
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Detective Vollmer that Mr. Erickson failed to meet with her and refused to be
interviewed regarding the accusations in this case.

Furthermore, the solicitation of

these comments on Mr. Erickson's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence by the prosecutor
constituted fundamental error and the error was not harmless.
Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as Incorporated by
the Fourteenth Amendments to the United State's Constitution, and Article I, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution provide that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself."

U.S. Const. Amend V; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13.

Additionally, Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution states that no person shall be
compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself.

Idaho Const. art.

I § 13. The Idaho courts have repeatedly held that using pre-Miranda or post-Miranda
silence to infer the guilt of the defendant is a violation of the defendant's rights to silence
and due process. See State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (1998);

State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 677, 67 P.3d 1283, 1289 (Ct. App. 2003).
In State

v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 551 P.2d 1344 (1976), the Idaho Supreme Court

held that, "If a prosecutor is allowed to introduce evidence of silence, for any purpose
then the right to remain silent guaranteed in Miranda

v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86

S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) becomes so diluted as to be rendered worthless."

Id. at 714-715, 551 P.2d at 1350-1351.

The Court went on to find, "[i]t is clearly

erroneous to allow evidence of post-arrest silence at trial for the purpose of raising an
inference of guilt." Id. at 715, 551 P.2d at 1351 (citation omitted). Similarly, in Doyle v.

Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the United States Supreme Court held "that the use for
impeachment purposes of petitioner's silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving
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Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." In
Doyle, the actions of the prosecutor in cross-examining the defendants as to the reason

they had not given their version of events at the time of their arrests were the actions
that violated the defendants' due process rights. Id. at 613-614, n.5.
In State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 820, 965 P.2d 174, 180 (1998), the Idaho
Supreme Court further extended its holding in White to pre-Miranda silence used for the
purposes of inferring guilt holding:
We believe the better rule is that which holds that the defendants' Fifth
Amendment right not to have their silence used against them in a court
proceeding is applicable pre-arrest and pre-Miranda warnings. The
constitutional right is always present. 'While the presence of Miranda
warnings might provide an additional reason for disallowing use of the
defendant's silence, they are not a necessary condition to such a
prohibition.'
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (th Cir. 1987)).

Furthermore, in State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 67 P.3d 1283 (Ct. App.
2003), the Idaho Court of Appeals held:
The prohibitions against prosecutorial use of pre-Miranda silence and of
post-Miranda silence spring from the same constitutional doctrine.
Therefore, we conclude that the State's presentation of evidence of
Kerchusky's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence constituted fundamental error
subject to appellate review.
Id. at 678, 67 P.3d at 1290.

Here, by eliciting testimony from Detective Vollmer during cross-examination
regarding Mr. Erickson's exercise of his right to silence by refusing to be interviewed or
comment on the allegations in this case, the prosecutor was clearly using this
information to infer Mr. Erickson's guilt based on these actions. After defense counsel
examined Detective Vollmer regarding her investigation into the accusations in this case
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and her interviews with L.H., C.E., and their grandmother Ms. Snow, the State began its
cross-examination of Detective Vollmer with the following exchange:
[Prosecutor]: Did you set up-did you try and interview Scott Erickson
concerning some of the information you had from L.H.?
[Vollmer]: Yes, I did.
[Prosecutor]: And how did you go about trying to interview him?
[Vollmer]: I spoke with him on the phone and attempted to set up a time
for him to come in for an interview.
[Prosecutor]: And did he come in?
[Vollmer]: No, sir. He refused to come in.
[Prosecutor]: Did you try and set it up a second time?
[Vollmer]: 1-1 believe I had two phone conversations. He didn't make it
on one and then he said he wouldn't be coming in on the second, but I
can't recall without looking at my notes.
[Prosecutor]: Typically in investigations do you try and get the-at least
the person that's the subject of the investigation, you try to get their
statement and their position on it?
[Vollmer]: Yes, sir. Try to get both sides of the[Prosecutor]: That didn't happen in this case because he never came in for
an interview?
[Vollmer]: He never came in for an interview, correct.
(Trial Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L.13.)
The defense's direct examination of Detective Vollmer had dealt with her
investigation into the claims made by the alleged victims in this case. (Trial Tr., p.388,
L.15- p.399, L.13.) The only reference to conversations Detective Vollmer might have
had with Mr. Erickson came up in the context of how Detective Vollmer found out that
Mr. Erickson was not in jail, contrary to what L.H. had told her. (Trial Tr., p.391, L.9 -
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p.392, L.4.) There was never any allegation that detective Vollmer failed to adequately
investigate the allegations or that Mr. Erickson had said something to her regarding the
allegations. (Trial Tr., p.388, L.15 - p.399, L.13.)
In State v. Moore, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the actions of the
prosecutor who elicited testimony from a State's witness that the defendant refused to
attend pre-arrest, pre-Miranda police interviews. Moore, 131 Idaho at 820-21, 965 P.2d
at 180-81. Although the Court held that the use of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to
infer guilt is unconstitutional, it found that the evidence was probative on the issue of
flight and, therefore, the testimony was admissible as to the that issue. Id. at 821, 965
P .2d at 181. Here, there was no valid reason for the prosecutor to illicit this information

other to infer Mr. Erickson's guilt and the testimony violated Mr. Erickson's rights to
silence and due process.

C.

The Violation Of Mr. Erickson's Rights To Due Process And Silence Constituted
Fundamental Error And It Was Not Necessary For Mr. Erickson To Obiect To
The Prosecutor's Actions At Trial In Order To Preserve The Issue For Appeal
No objections pursuant to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments were made

against the prosecution's use of the above questions and statements at trial.

(Trial

Tr., p.399, L.15 - p.400, L.13.) However, Idaho Courts have previously held that the
use of pre- or post- Miranda silence to imply guilty is a fundamental error that is
reviewable absent an objection. State v. Strouse, 133 Idaho 709, 992 P.2d 158 (1999);
State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 678, 67 P.3d 1283, 1290 (Ct. App. 2003).

As described above in sections II (C), and incorporated herein by reference, an
appellate court will generally only address issues on appeal which were preserved
through an objection at the trial court level, an appellate court may consider
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fundamental error in a criminal case, even though no objection was made below. See
State v. Rozajewski, 130 Idaho 644, 645, 945 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Ct. App. 1997). The

Idaho Court of Appeals has previously held that a claim that the State improperly used a
defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence constitutes fundamental error. In State v.
Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 67 P.3d 1283 (Ct. App. 2003), the Idaho Court of Appeals

held:
The prohibitions against prosecutorial use of pre-Miranda silence and of
post-Miranda silence spring from the same constitutional doctrine.
Therefore, we conclude that the State's presentation of evidence of
Kerchusky's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence constituted fundamental error
subject to appellate review.
Id. at 678, 67 P.3d at 1290.

Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the issues in State v. Strouse, 133
Idaho 709, 992 P.2d 158 (1999), under a fundamental error analysis. In Strouse, the
Court found the evidence regarding the defendant's post-Miranda silence was
inadmissible and, after finding the error was not harmless, vacated the conviction and
remanded the case for new trial. Id. at 714. 992 P.2d at 163.
More recently, in State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 114 P.3d 133 (Ct. App. 2005),
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a due process violation following a prosecutor's
use of a defendant's silence against him amounts to fundamental error. Id. 141 Idaho at
577, 114 P.3d at 135. Therefore, Mr. Erickson asserts that the prosecutor's use of his
silence in this case to infer his guilt constituted fundamental error and is reviewable
absent an objection below.
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D.

The Prosecutor's Use Of Mr. Erickson's Refusal To Be Interviewed Regarding
The Accusations To Infer His Guilt Was Not Harmless Error
In Strouse, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that, "[w]hen inadmissible

evidence has been introduced, the question is whether this Court is 'convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been reached had the evidence
been properly excluded?"'
omitted).

Strouse, 133 Idaho at 714, 992 P.2d at 163 (citation

Similarly, in Poland, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated, "[f]or a

fundamental error to be held harmless, the court must declare a belief, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence
complained of contributed to the conviction." Poland, 116 Idaho at 37, 773 P.2d at 654
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
Here, as argued above in Section ll(D) and incorporated by reference, the case
hinged entirely on the credibility of L.H. and C.E. Evidence was presented regarding
how there stories had changed over time and the family turmoil that has existed
between

Mr. Erickson and his wife/ex-wife Tammy. Furthermore, although charged

with three counts of lewd and lascivious conduct, Mr. Erickson was only found guilty of
two counts of sexual abuse of a child and was acquitted entirely of the third.
Accordingly, the State's comment inferring guilt from Mr. Erickson's silence cannot be
harmless.
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IV.
The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It Admitted Evidence Of Alleged
Irrelevant Conduct Or Prior Bad Acts Of The Defendant
A.

Introduction
Mr. Erickson asserts the district court erred in admitting allegations of prior

conduct or bad acts that he allegedly committed when it allowed in testimony that he
had not or was not paying child support. Mr. Erickson contends that the State failed to
give notice under 404(b) that it was going to use this evidence, and that even with
adequate notice this evidence was not admissible under 404(b).
B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing the admissibility of 404(b) evidence the appellate court employs

a two-part analysis. State v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 38 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2001). The
appellate court reviews the relevancy of the evidence de novo. Id. The determination
of whether the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. This requires the appellate court to
answer three questions: (1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as
calling for an exercise of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted consistently with
governing legal standards so as to stay within the outer boundaries of its discretion; and
(3) whether the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v.
Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 592, 977 P.2d 203, 206(1999).
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C.

The District Court Erred Admitting Testimony The Mr. Erickson Had Not Paid Any
Child Support For His Children Because It Was Impermissible Character
Evidence Under 404(b) And The State Failed To Give Notice Of Its Intent To Use
This Information
It is part of the American legal system that an accused may only be convicted

based upon proof that he committed the crime with which he is charged and not based
upon poor character. State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241,244, 880 P.2d 771, 774 (Ct. App.
1994).

Evidence of misconduct not charged in an underlying offense may have an

unjust influence on the jurors and may lead them to determine guilt based upon either:
(1) a presumption that if the defendant did it before, he must have done it this time; or
(2) an opinion that it does not really matter whether the defendant committed the
charged crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow for other bad acts. Id. at
244-45, 880 P.2d at 774-75.

Therefore, I.R.E. 404 precludes the use of character

evidence or other misconduct evidence to imply that the defendant must have acted
consistently with those past acts or traits. Id.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution in a
criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown ....
To admit evidence of prior misconduct, two things must be shown.

State v.

Medina, 128 Idaho 19, 24, 909 P.2d 637, 642 (Ct. App. 1996). "First, the evidence must

be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged ... [sJecond,
the court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
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outweighed by the danger of causing unfair prejudice to the defendant." Id. The Idaho
Court of Appeals has held:
This exclusion is based upon the theory that evidence of other crimes
'induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed
the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character. It, therefore,
takes the jury away from their primary consideration of [the] guilt or
innocence of the particular crime on trial.'
State v. Winkler, 112 Idaho 917, 919, 736 P.2d 1371, 1372 (Ct. App. 1987) (citing
State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510, 854, P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978)). Ultimately, I.R.E.

404(b) is a rule of exclusion rather than inclusion. State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 721722, 23 P.3d 786, 795-796 (Ct. App. 2001); see generally State v. Grist, 2009 Opinion
No. 14 (January 29, 2009).
Here, while Tammy Erickson was testifying regarding the incident where she,
and her children came to Mr. Erickson's and took the truck, the State asked Tammy
Erickson if she was getting child support for the children. (Trial Tr., p.437, L.10 - p.439,
L.9-25.) Defense counsel immediately objected stating this was irrelevant and improper
character evidence. (Trial Tr., p.439, Ls.9-25.) After the State argued that it was simply
trying to show her desperate need for a vehicle, the district court overruled the
objection, and Tammy Erickson was allowed to testify that she was not receiving any
child support. (Trial Tr., p.439, Ls.19-25.) By asking Tammy Erickson whether she was
receiving child support, the State solicited testimony by inference that Mr. Erickson was
not providing child support for his children. Mr. Erickson contends this testimony was
improper character evidence under I.R.E. 404 and should not have been allowed in.
Unfortunately, the district court did not appear to recognize that this was
character evidence under 404(b), despite the defense's objection that this was improper
character evidence. The failure to pay child support is a bad act by the defendant.
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Although it was not clear whether he was obligated legally to pay child support, possibly
making his failure a crime, the mere act of not paying child support is a bad act,
indicating that Mr. Erickson is not supporting his children. (See I.C. § 18-401; State v.
Shaw, 96 Idaho 897, 539 P.2d 250 (1975) (findng the court had jurisdiction over out of

state defendant's criminal charges for failure to pay child support).
This evidence should not have been admitted in this case because it did not go
to an issue material to the crime charged. Mr. Erickson was charged with three counts
of lewd conduct with a minor; therefore, whether Mr. Erickson was paying child support
was completely irrelevant to the crimes charged in this case.

Furthermore, the

prejudicial effect of such evidence substantially outweighed the probative value. The
jury was most apt to take away from this testimony that Mr. Erickson has not paid child
support for his children, indicating he is a bad father.

Such an inference greatly

outweighs any probative calue.
Finally, even if this was proper 404(b) evidence, no notice was ever provided by
the State that it was going to use such evidence at trial. In State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho
225, 178 P.3d 28 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court found that the failure of the State to
provide 404(b) notice prior to soliciting bad act testimony constituted reversible error.
145 Idaho at 227, 178 P.3d at 30.

In Sheldon, the State introduced evidence of

admissions by the defendant related to his substance abuse. Id. at 229, 178 P.3d at 32.
In allowing the testimony in, the district court failed to recognize that this was improper
character evidence under 404(b) and did not engage in the 404(b) analysis.

Id.

Furthermore, the State failed to provide any notice of its intent to use this evidence. Id.
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Similarly here, the State never provided notice that it would be using evidence
related to Mr. Erickson's failure to pay child support at trial. Prior to trial the State filed a
Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts under 404(b)
stating that:
The general nature of the evidence will be consistent with the
testimony given by each of the alleged victims at the preliminary hearing in
this matter wherein they alleged that there were other crimes, wrong, or
acts committed against them by the Defendant of a lewd and lascivious
nature which involved touching of the alleged victims in the vaginal or
breast area.
Particularly, the alleged victim [L.H.] will testify that the Defendant
touched her when she was residing in Pocatello, Idaho, when he was in
bed with her. This incident was witnessed partially by Susan Snow the
maternal grandparent of the alleged victim, [L.H.] Susan Snow will testify
discovering Defendant in bed with [L.H.]
(R., p.27.) This notice does not cite or make any reference to the defendant's failure to

pay child support.
Therefore, the district court erred in allowing Tammy Erickson to testify that she
had not received any child support.

V.
The Repeated Misconduct And Errors In This Case Resulted In Cumulative Error
Depriving Mr. Erickson Of A Fair Trial
Under the cumulative error doctrine, the reversal of a conviction is required when
there is '"an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless, but
when aggregated ... show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention of the defendant's
constitutional right to due process."' State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 165 P.3d 273 (2007)
(quoting State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998)). Here, even if
each of the errors by themselves were harmless, the accumulation of these errors
demonstrates that Mr. Erickson was denied his right to a fair trial under the United
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States and Idaho Constitutions. See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Idaho Const., art.
I§ 13.

The State's repeated misconduct throughout Mr. Erickson's trial deprived him of
a fair trial.

The misconduct began with the prosecutor's use of his peremptory

challenges to only strike men from the jury in violation of Batson.

The misconduct

continued throughout the trial from the opening statements to the closing arguments.
The prosecutor impermissibly vouched for witnesses, commented on facts not in
evidence, improperly argued evidence not admitted at trial, repeatedly appealed to the
passions and prejudices of the jury, and solicited testimony that Mr. Erickson refused to
be interviewed regarding the allegations in violation of Mr. Erickson's rights to be free
from incrimination and due process. Given this flagrant misconduct, it can hardly be
said that Mr. Erickson's conviction was obtained through a fair and just trial.
Additionally, the district court allowed in testimony that Mr. Erickson had not paid any
child support for his children, which was improper character evidence. Therefore, in
light of these errors, Mr. Erickson was deprived of a fair trial and his conviction should
be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Erickson respectfully requests that his conviction be vacated and his case
remanded for a new trial.
DATED this 1ih day of March, 2009.

EATHER M. CARLSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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MR. HELM: I would, your Honor,
1 in the Pocatello school system by a resource officer
Congratulations. You've been called upon to do one
2 and a counselor, it was reported to their officers that
of the most important jobs in your civic duty or your
3 specialize in that. They realize initially that this
civic lives, There will be no greater job than to be
4 really took place in Bear Lake. They contacted our law
called to sit in judgement of facts when somebody is
5 enforcement sheriff's office and the deputy that was
accused of a crime. It's our connection to Main
6 assigned to that simply dropped it, stood there for
Street. We ask ordinary people to do extraordinary
7 more than three years. Whep. they inquired what had
things. On behalf of my office we certainly appreciate
8 become of it, it got turned over to Deputy Martinez.
the time you take, the dedication you have to be here
9 Martinez contacted my office and three years later we
and the fact that you will now sit as jurors.
10 start trying to locate these victims. Try to
This is, as you kind of get a feel and we talk
·11 · re-interview them, trying to talk to them, Trying to
aboutit from time to time, a delicate case, It's a
12 .go back. That was our mistake. Believe me, I have
breach of trust. It's a breach of the most basic trust
13 apologized to them. I've apologized to the parents and
that we have as human beings and as families. Not the
14 loved ones. It should not have happened, but it did
breach of trust of a stranger, not the breach of trust
15 happen.
of a distant relative, not a classmate. We're talking
16
When you talk about a breach of trust, keep in mind
about the breach of trust ofa father. The trust the
17 some of the things you're going to see, and keep in
child has in its mother, its father. The duty morally
18 mind the type of breach it is. They are always
and ethically to protect the child has been breached.
19 conflicted because by reporting it they risk that a
It's the breaching of that trust not because you
20 parent may go to jail, that he may be punished. I
let them in harm's way, but it even goes more basic.
21 think Crystal even asked them what's going to happen to
22 mydad,
You are the perpetrator of that breach. You looked
upon young daughters as sexual objects. So from the
23
So I gness when you look at your common
beginning, when we have cases that involve family, that
24 experiences, and I always call on juries, kind oflook
25 at common experiences. This is probably one of the
involve parents, breaching that basic trust that
27
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·1 children have, you will always see, in my opinion,
1 exceptions. You just have not seen the damaged goods
. 2 trying to recollect and tell you what happened. They
2 damaged goods. What you see are not professional
3 are subject to cross-examination. They are subject to
. 3 answers. What you see are not people such as me or my
4 police officers that deal in the court oflaw. You do
4 speculation. ·What I'm going to tell you is I don't
5 believe children under these circumstances are going to
5 not see adults who are mature socially. What you will
6 lie to you. I think you will find the truth. We will
6 see will be damaged children, Sometimes I never know
7 call Barbara Snow•. Barbara. Snow is the grandmother of
7 how to predict it. It's always hard to understand and
8 these children. And as evidence kind of trickles out ·
8 predict their testimony, Sometimes they won't have
· 9 · · through these two or three days, you will find this is
9 good eye contact. They won'tlook you in the eye. ·
10 a very dysfunctional family and the parenting ·
·10 . s.ometimes you'll see their head fall; Sometimes, Why
11 responsibilities and the obligations of parenting.
11 didn't you report it? Because when the breach of a
12 .yoimg child is by the father, the mother, somebody in a
12
I don't particularly disagree with that I think
13., trusted position, they're conflicted. It's somebody
13 that's kind of true. Grandmother who just had lost her
14 they love, It's somebody they bonded with as a parent.
14 husband kind of steps into this family. She's kind of
15 Sometimes a reporting doesn't take place when the
·15 watching after these children. While they're there,
16 u,.cidenttook place,
16 mom is in the women's prison going through arehab
17 · · We will call an expert, The expert is a licensed
17 program for drug abuse. And so grandma has the
· 18 children in Pocatello and sehooled and kind of watching
· 18 counselor in Idaho, practices mainly in Boise, but the
1~ majority of her practice is counseling people who have · 19 after them. She wimessed some things during this
.20. · been sexually abused, especially adolescents and
20 period of time, I think we're talking about early part
. .i1 · children. She'll talk about some of these things that
21 of 2004, January through.April of2004, when there was
· . 22 you will see from the children thattestify here. You
22 Barbara in Pocatello. Grandma·· she saw things that
23 are seeing these children years after the incident.
23 she thought was unusual, that just kind offelt was
· 24 · Some of that because they didn't report it timely, some
24 . disgusting. She'll say she saw the stepfather, the
· l25 · ·ofthat burden falls upon us. When it was discovered
25 defendant here, Mr. Erickson, hugging his stepdaughter
.
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Later on the biological child comes forth and she's
agal --some things made me pretty uncomfortable.
Some time in January, February, March, we're not sure,
2004, he had taken her from grandmother's residence in
Pocatello and taken her to his grandparents, or his
parents, in St. Charles, the Ericksons. They had a
trailer home or trailer at their house where he was
living in year round. Mom and dad had separated. Not
divorced, simply separated.
Excuse me. It's my allergy season so I'm taking
meds and my mouth dries out.
In that trailer, her and her brother kind of fight
over who was going to have the edge, but dad is
sleeping with them in the same bed. Brother fights her
· and he gets edge. Dad's in between. After brother
goes to sleep,I think as I reeall her story, dad
starts kind of rubbing her back. Next thing, he's kind
of rubbing her vagina area and buttocks. And I think
he even says he rubs her breast area and then he says,
"Does that make you feel good when daddy rubs you that
way?" Shesaid, "No.Itdoesnot.•
So I believe that the evidence will show Ibey
became sexual objects. And when you see the conflicted
testimony, when you see the strain, emotional strain,
emotional trauma, they go through to come back and have
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to testify to strangers. And we all are strangers to
i
them. It's very difficult. But we think the
observations of grandma are critical in making a
decision on this case.
Your job is important to us in law enforcement.
It's important to the prosecutor. We think the
testimony of not just the stepdaughter, but also the
biological daughter, we think when you look at them and
then you say, Well, why in the world would they lie
about that? At that time in their lives he is the
·father. They are emotionally bonded with him. They
love him. They'll tell you that.
So it starts as a breach of trust, a breach of a
family trust between a parent and child. What you see
testifying are the damaged goods. We think it will end
as a breach of trust because we think we will present a
··-convincingcasethatis-proofbeyonda-reasonabledoubt
that he committed these dastardly deeds against these
children of his own. Thank you.
·
THE COURT: Mr. Wuthrich, do you want to make your
opening statement at this time?
MR. WUTHRICH: I do.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MR. WUTHRICH: Well, ladies and gentlemen of the
jury, I, too, wantto thank you for your time. I grew
31
1 up watching Perry Mason. I loved Perry Mason. He'd
2 get up there and he would just rip the State's
3 witnesses apart, they would crumble on the stand, and
4 everybody would know for sure who the guilty party was,
5 And the State, Mr. Berger, why, he was always crushed
6 and he never won a case against Perry. That's not
7 going to happen today.
I also like Law and Order. It's a great, great
8
show,
lots of drama, Jack - I can't remember. McCoy.
9
10 Jack McCoy, he gets np there and gives a great policy
11 argument why this should be a crime. They've always
12 got these guest defense attorneys and they come in and
13 give us another policy argument, whether it's a problem
14 with age or a problem with society, with dealing with
15 the races, or something like that, why this person
16 should not be held responsible and then the jury goes
17 out and makes abig policy judgment. That's not going
18 to happen either. No, this is going to be much more of
19 a laborious task for the jurors. You're going to have
20 to aetuallyweigh the evidence, and you're going to
21 have to decide credibility of witnesses.
The State said they're going to show these are
22
23 damaged goods. These children are damaged goods.
24 Well, I think I tend to agree with him, but for a
25 different reason. It's a question of family dynamks.
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1 and she just looked uncomfortable, kind of squirming,
2 wanting to get out. She didn't say anything, but she
3 just was kind of staring at him, What are you doing?
Thenat a later time, or perhaps before this, but
4
5 · in that period of time, she goes into the bedroom to go
6 check on the kids before going to bed, going to bed,
7 saying good night, I think, and had no idea that Scott
8 Erickson, the father, was in that room where the
9 children sleep. He. was under the covers. So as she's
10 talking to them he pops out from under the covers. He
11 was under the covers with stepdaughter, Lorissa.
Again, that's just-- I don't like what I'm seeing.
12
13 I just don'tlike what that's implying, Had no
14 information that anything was going on, but just like
15 any grandma or perhaps grandpa. I'm a grandfather. It
16 would just be suspicious. What's going on? She was
17· --then·contacte&by-Jaw,enforcementauthoritysome time
18 in April and they said that Lorissa, I believe, made a
19 statement to the resource counselor that she thought
20 she was being inappropriately touched by her
21 stepfather. So they start the investigation. She
22 kicks him out. I don't want you there, get out of
23 here. I'm not taking that chance. My worse suspicions
24 have been confirmed about what the granddaughter is
25 saying.
.
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1

1 complete deliberations, so I will save it for later.
All right. Mr. Hehn, you may now make your closing
2
3 argument.
MR. HELM: Thank you, your Honor.
4
I think the bus about arrived on time. I think we
5
told
you we thought this would be three or four days.
6

law as given in these instructions, whether the

2 defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offenses
3 charged or of any included offense. With respect to
4 the facts alleged in Count I of the Information, the
5
6
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offense oflewd conduct with aminor under sixteen
includes the offense of sexual abuse of a child. It is
possible for you to return on C-ount I any one, but only
one, of the following verdicts: Guilty oflewd conduct
with a minor, guilty of sexual abuse of a child, or not
guilty of C-ount I.
With respect to the facts alleged in C-ount II of
the Information, the offense oflewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen includes the offense of sexual
abuse of a child. It is possible for you to return on
C-oimt II any one, but only one, of the following
verdicts: Guilty oflewd conduct with a minor, guilty
·-ofsexual abuse of a child, not guilty of C-ount II.
· With respect to the facts alleged in C-ount III of
the Information, the offense oflewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen includes the offense of sexual
abuse ora child. It is possible for you to return on
C-ount III any one, but only one, of the following
verdicts: Guilty oflewd conduct with a minor, guilty
of sexual abuse of a child, not guilty of C-ount -- that
should say C-ount III.
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473
When you are deliberating, you should first
1
2 consider the crime charged. You should consider the
3 included offense only in the event the State has failed
4 to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt of the
5
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defendant's guilt with respect to the crime charged.
Do you have the verdict on there next? Yes. Okay,
that is the •• the official verdict is this one that
has blue paper behind it. The ones you have, again,
are a copy. This is the one that the presiding person
·will fill out.
MR. WUTHRICH: Judge, wehavethesametypoon
.C-ount III and in the verdict form.
THE COURT: All right. On the official verdict rm
going to under Count III, the last sentence says not
guilty of Countl. rm crossing out Countl and
putting Count III, and I am initialing it.
Gentlemen, do either of you want me to read the
verdict as it's written? I think the instruction I
gaveMR.HELM: Idon'tbelieveso.
THEOOURT: -covers it.
MR. HELM: I'm satisfied with that, your Honor,
MR. WUTHRICH: No.
THE COURT: All right. The final instruction is
Instrnction Number 33, That's to be read after you
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It's going to be three days perhaps.
·Gosh, I really appreciate you taking time from your
families, husbands,jobs, to do this civil duty. I've
been doing it for 40 years so I know how important it
is in society, in the free society that we live in,
that we have people willing to sacrifice their time to
come in and sit in judgment of a fellow person. I
wouldn't want it any other way. We need common
everyday people. We need the moms and dads, the
grandpas, the sons and daughters who live on Main
· Streettotakea1ook atwhat-wedo aslawyers,what we
do as prosecutors, what we do as judges and tell us,
communicate with us, on what these cases are and what
it takes for the State to make this case. .
I told you it's about abreach of trust. It's a
major breach of trust. It's always the theme any time
you have a child that's been molested by a parent. It
will always be the theme. It will never change.
Cultures long before we had civilizations, cultures

1 always protected the children. It was unwritten.
2 Children are a protected class. Not only do we protect
3

them from strangers and outsiders, but we must protect

4 them from our own lustful behaviors. The worst breach
5

of that trust, as I told you in the opening statement,

6 is when a parent breaches that trust fu asexual
7 manner.
Understand when these children testify these many .
years later, the stories are always going to be
somewhat conflicted. And imagine with me the person I
trust has breached that. It is a family that is
dysfunctional. Mom openly admits she had a drug
problem. Not uncommon in our society today, Mom openly
admitted, "I was in rehab. I was trying to get that·
monkey off my back." But. it still left the family, the
daughters, col!f)icted. If at 10 and 11 rm first
17 contacted and touched inappropriately by that parent,
18 who do I turn to? Do I even understand that it may be
19 inappropriate at that time? Ilove that person. I
20 don't want that person in trouble. I don't want that
21 person to go to jail, They already bad some of that
22 existing within this family·· extended family, I
23 should say. We already had Uncle Troy convicted. We
24 already ha.d Uncle Robert convicted,· They understood if
25 they came forward and testified or told the story that

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

476

.

I
I
II
I
I

I
I

-I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I

1 that may result in their father being punished. That's
2 avery, very, very difficult position that we would

place a child in.
And you saw what achild goes through. We have
very few interviews. You know, they talked about 12
interviews and usually there is a minimum of 12
interviews. Not near that many interviews here.
Whoever they told the story to first, I believe in this
case we had aschool counselor they told it to. They
brought in the people, Detective Volhner, that
specialize in larger cities. Crystal told it to her
grandmother. Butwhowasinthepositionoftrustin . ·
Crystal's life at that time? Mom's in rehab. Dad's
the perpetrator. They typically will talk to that
person that they feel comfortable with. That person
they have some volume of trust with. That turned out
· 17··-tobe·grandma;-Mrs. Snow,Susie. ·· ······ --- ·
She told you before she got the message from
18
Crystal
that she just saw things that made her
19
20 uncomfortable. She saw that hugging from behind. Not
21 face-to-face, but the hugging from behind. She saw
22 what she thought was an uncomfortable feeling by her
23 daughter·· or by her granddaughter. Did she see
24 anything illegal? No. I hug my granddaughters. I hug
25 my daughters. But just the look upon her face, the
3
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1 suspicion that agrandmother and mother may have. Not
2 enough to make an issue, but just simply hum.
And then asecond time she finds when she
3
4 thought·· Scott was staying there when mom was

5 rehabing. She goes back to the bedroom to check on the
6 kids and out from under the covers he pops. She's
7 . glaring at him. Didn't say anything. Didn't really
8 see anything, but just did not like it. Thoughtit was
9 wrong. What's Scott's reaction to that? Grabs his bag
10 and he gets out the door. Grabs his bags and leaves.
11 Before she had a chance to question, before she had a
12 chance to kick him out, grabbed it and left. That
13 doesn't sound innocentto agrandmother. It's not
14 goingtosoundinnocenttoamother. Itwasnot ·
15 innocent
16 . Unfortunately, later on after the story went in to
17 the school counselor and then to the I think deputy
18 sheriff in Bannock County, she finds out her worst
19 fears. Now here's alady who lost her husband of
20 ·several years to cancer, 2003, September. Her daughter
21 is in rehab. She is that safety net She is that·
22 extended family. And then she finds out what she had
23 observed, what had raised the hairs on the back of her
24 head, what was going on here became her worst fear, her
25 worst nightmare. Her granddaughters were being
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I don't know. You heard alot of testimony from
experts. rm not convinced that experts always help
us. I think sometimes you just simply believe a
Lorissa, you believe a Crystal, or you just don't
believe them, I believe their stories·· I still have
my allergies, excuse me. I believe that their
testimony is very credible. Does that mean a defense
attorney or adefendant can't punch a little bit here,
punch a little bit here, peck a little bit here? It's
always the case with children. It's always the case
with children, They're not an eyewitness. They are
the subjects of the intrusion and to their privacy and
the most personal things to them by the trust of the
parent
They're not the distant observer, Yes, I saw him
·-leave the-ba:nki I-sawhim-with.a-gun,..1-saw.him hit. I
am the distant observer. I'm telling you what I saw.
That is never true in child molestation cases. Ifyou
want that real clean slate that has no imperfections in
it, that has no possibilities, you'll never get it in
child molestation cases. This prosecutor and the
prosecutor will always have that difficulty. It does
not exist I told you that in my opening statement I
prepared you for that. You saw it You will believe
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or disbelieve.
I don't know that I go back to read jury
instructions. We spend alot of time reading them, but
there has always been an instruction that I see given
that's iµven by this Court, too, Instruction Number,5
of the original set; and I'll just read the second page
because I think child cases when we're talking about
molestation, really keep this in mind. "There is no
magieal formula by which one may evaluate testimony.
You bring with you to this courtroom all of the
experiences and background in your lives. In your
everyday affairs you determine for yourself whom you
believe, what you believe and how much weight you
attach to what you are told. The same considerations
that you use in your everyday dealings in.making these
decisions are the considerations which.you should apply
in these deliberations." Simple, straightforward and
perhaps the essence of your duties. We can't give you a
magic guideline that tells you that,
Let's talk about some of these things when we look
at the children involved in this, and rm going to
start out with some of the experts. I thought the
experts at times helped, but I thought at times it was
burdensome, almost boring. I want to go back to some
differentiation between the experts.
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As I recall, Mydell Yeager, the lady we called,
said she was an actual licensed counselor, that she
. specialized in counseling children of sexual abuse,
that she had had approximately three thousand cases,
She was still actively involved in counseling these
kids. She had testified for several different
jurisdictions within the State ofidaho as an expert.
She told you that s.ometimes when kids are confronted by
a total stranger,just clear out of the blue, that they
willinitially deny it. Isn't that Crystal? Had no
idea that she's going to be confronted by a police
officer and asked about her father.
The initial reaction I think almost always in that
case is not going to be that unusual, You're going to
deny. The officer is not somebody you know, It's not
somebody you trust. I think she was "· going to get
her age right, I think she was about 13 or 14 when she
was confronted with this. You just •• what would you
say? You use your common sense. Put yourself in that
position. What would you say? Even if you had been
abused 11nd somebody out of the clear blue just knocks
on the door and asks about your father, you would
probably deny it.
You would then go to a person you trust. Mom's not
there, grandma is. You might start your disclosure
481
then. I don't find that unusual at all, I don't find
that surprising. I don't find that justification for
not believing what Crystal told us. Does that now
mean - I mean, what is her motive for getting up and
lying under oath about what her father did to her? Why
in the world would Crystal lie in that situation? Ask
yourself that. Why would that girl lie in that
situation? Because if she's telling the truth; he's
guilty. The only way he's not guilty is you have to
accept she decided to get tip and lie to us all,
People lie for motives, for reasons. I suggest to
you she's telling you the exact truth, Do not find her
story not credible because she initially denied it to a
·strange police officer. She told it in Bright
Tomorrow. She told th.e story in the preliminary
hearing, She told her story here. There is no
recanting of it. Oh, we can talk about locations,
times, but she was pretty detailed, wasn't she? She
knew there, she knew where she was at, shelmew she was
at grandma and grandpa's in St. Charles, she knew her
brother was there, she knew her dad was there, she knew
where she was, kind ofin the bed barely going to
sleep, she kiiew how the touching started, rubbing her
breasts, buttocks and then this, "How does it feel when
daddy rubs you there?" And she started to cry. I
482
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couldn't hear it because I'm over there. I asked her
to repeat it. She didn't wantto repeat it. Am Ito
suggest now that this is not sexual in his eyes? Would
any of you not believe this is lewd and lascivious,
this is not sexual battery of a minor? Would you allow
your daughters and your granddaughters? None of us
would. We would be irate.
Lorissa; I think you could probably sit there and
pick and pick and pick and pick and, well, she said
that one time, one time she said it that way. Well,
isn't she recanting? Let's go back and look. Let's
look at everything here. Let's not just pick here and
pick here. Let's look what's going on, When she's u
years old·· I thinkCrystal was 10 when this
happened •• Crystal I think·· or not Crystal but
Lorissa explained she was 11. And maybe it starts out
with a slap on the butt, kind of a hug, maybe
just·· do you really know what's going on? When did
you get uncomfortable with it? How far does your
father have to go before you're uncomfortable with it,
you know?
She talks about specific things. She talks about
she thought it was going on all the time. In her mind
it is. Every time he might even be giving her a hug
and nothing intended at.all. But why? Because of the
483
prior touching that she was very uncomfortable'with
that was illegal, inappropriate. What might be just a
hug suddenly becomes •• she becomes very, very,
uncomfortable with ordinary life from the person whom
had done the things to her, from the person who had
fondled her breast, had fondled her buttocks.
Is she confused? I think one time she told the
officer it was her breast, it was underneath her pants,·
panties it was on the outside. She couldn't remember
for sure. She thought they were both on the outside
when she testified. Does that mean she's not
believable? Absolutely not•. We heard what both
experts said. The ability to reeall specifics by the
way the mind works just doesn't work that way. They
cannot give you dates. I'm not required to prove a
specific date and time. They kind of remember the
event. They remember their feelings. They seek the
repressant, If it was a stranger and they were 10 or. ·
11, they would have reported it right away. There is
no conflict there, What the guy did in the park when
he offered you a piece of candy, they would report it.
It's when it involves a loved one that they hesitate to ·
report it, that they become conflicted. Maybe nobody
believes me,
She talked atlength. If it helps you decide the .
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1 credibility of this case and the witnesses, use that.
2 I goess when I look at his 200 cases, none for 12
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years, Ijust think there is a major, major difference
in the experience. It reminds me of somebody who
wanted to learn to ranch afarm. I can go to the
person who's practiced farming with his father, with
his grandfather, has milked the cows, has raised the
crops, cut the hay, branded the cattle, brought cattle
in, and I can have him talk to me about farming, about
what you need to do to rear cattle, what you need to do
to have a good crop, whento harvest, cut your hay, or
I can talk to the person who went to school, got a
doctor's degree and read about it. We would always
choose the hands-on expert.
In common everyday living conditions, if I wanted a
mechanic to work on my car, I want somebody that's had
experience. I don't want to downplay formal training,
but I'm saying when it gets right down to the brass
tacks, I like the formal training but I really want
somebody who is ahands-on expert. Don't bore me with
all that."If I took what he said, Mr. Rybicki, I
couldn't prosecute anybody. There would always be some
little thing that's not perfect. Or am I supposed to
get me a doctor of psychology with a background in
forensic interviews and bring them in here? When a

1 saw my cousins come forward, do take the stand, go
2 through what they eventually went through. They
3 survived, maybe I can come forward and talk about it
4 It wouldn't have encouraged false testimony. It
wouldn't have encouraged false reporting. ft would be
just the opposite. He had to admit that He only gave
us one side. Yes, contagion can work both ways.
Sometimes encourages people to come forward and tell
the truth. Show and tell, or bad touching/good
10 touching in elementary schools. Sometimes kids come
11 forward and start talking about it. ·
She said four in three thousand she thought had
12
13 reason to believe were false reporting of sexual abuse.
14 That's almost statistically insignificant. His own
15 statistics were almost identical. I was looking at I
16 think slide 15 and it said 15 or 25 percent then
17·· · · divorce;·butit-didn!tsaywhat-kindofabuse.·Ifyou
18 read the fine print·· and we're talking about nine
19 thousand people that were interviewed and did this
20 study-· of those 129 had allegations ofsome type of
21 sexual abuse. The other abuse didn't include·· they
22 included all types of abuse, you know. Sexual abuse was
23 129 out of 9000. Of that 50 percent of them were six
24 or younger. That's not this case. They were all over
25 that. .We know young children six and younger are
5
6
7
8
9

487

485
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

child comes, "Oh, don't say anything. I've got to get
a doctor to interview you. I can't do anything until
we've got a recording and a person trained." It
doesn't work that way in the real world. It's just not
. practical.
Don't let them persuade you that this is aweak
case because we're not doing what their expert thought
we should do. It's a strong case because these
9 witnesses, Lorissa and Crystal, are believable. And
10 ..they took alot of shots at them, a lot of
11 cross-examination, a lot of anger, hard to control. It .
12 came out in chunks and bites. She should be angry. I
13 understand her anger. Don't judge her because she ·
14 showed emotion or anger. She should show that. If
15 that helps her heal, helps her get by it, then she
16 should show it. Don't use that as a reason notto
17 believe her. Don't use the expert. Ahha; it's
18 possible, it's possible, it's possible.
19
But when you get down to it, what was the one
20 thing? Contagion. Never heard that term before. You
21 know that it was a contagion thing because Uncle Troy
22 had been convicted. I think Crystal testified in that
23 case. Uncle Robert had admitted and was convicted and
24 now they've come forward with false testimony. It
25 would be the opposite. They would be encouraged. ·I
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subject to alot of manipulation and suggestion. I'm
not disagreeing with him on that. Of those they believe
about 33 percent may have some basis in fact. When you
run the arithmetic on that, it comes out almost
identical, 12 and 9000. That's the same as 4and 3,000
almost right down to a level.
So even the study that they tried to convince us
because this was a conflict divorce, I'm not sure it
always qualified as a conflict divorce because most
divorces are settled without conflict. There wasn't a
lot of custody disputes going on. I would tell you
that we do look at that as prosecutors and police
officers when we got divorces and custody battles and
wegettheseallegations. Weknowfromour
experiences, we know from Dr. Mydell Yeager's people,
let's look at that. Don't turn a blind eye to it
That's not news to me. That's not new to me. We look
at it very carefully. To suggest we just don't look at
·. it is just not true. I've been here too long. I've
seen too inany cases. I look at it.
But rve got two saying it, not just one. We have
one family member, same age group, complaining about
the UJtcle, the grandfather, in this case the father•
Who else did you have access to, they complained, no
. problems, another red flag. Huh, do I go forth on this?
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Youknow,seriouscharges. Youwanttomakesureyou
look at them before you at least do prosecution.
Two here. Both the children •• and while Lorissa is
a stepchild, that's really the only father she's ever
had. I think you'll have Exhibit2. Exhibit2 kind of
portrays gililt feelings. There is no recanting ofit.
She loved him to pieces. Just really bad about what
she said, opened my mouth, it came out. But she does
not say that it is false, I'm sorry I lied about it.
Andnotapartialrecanting. Idon'tknow. Ireadit.
I don't see anything in there that suggests it didn't
happen, It's just a conflicted child and has some and that's understandable, That's why I went back over
that instruction.
Think about your own experiences. Think about your
childhoods. Think about your roles as parents,
grandparents.-Y-ouknow,-how-would-you-feel? Howwould
you feel knowing that your testimony might put your
father through that, somebody you love, I find it
prettycommon. Idon'tfindthatextraordinary, I
don'tfintl that for a reason not to believe her. It
gives her credibility, It's emotional. It's real. It
adds to that credibility.
I don't know that I've ever used that argument as a
reasonnottobelieveher. Shetoldyouaboutthe
489
telephone conversation. I think that's something else
they're going to pounce on and suggest. Is that a
retraction or recanting? And I understand when it's a
father or parental figure who's perpetrating the crime
recanting is not uncommon, Not uncommon and we can
understand why if you think aboutyour own conflicted
emotions as a child in that situation, especially the
dysfunctiona:lity of this family,
But even then there is not a recall of that. She
doesn'tsay, "Ididn'tdoit." Shesays, "Ididn't
have a molestation problem." She didn't, That's
abs9lutely true. At that time in.her life, and she .
explained what she meant, she did .not have a
molestation problem. He was gone. Health and Welfare
kicked him out. Told Barbara, ;'Can't be around them.
You gotto protect these children, We've gotto step
in until we find out what's going on." So in her mind
she didn't Butlookatthis, Whenshe'slivingin
St. Charles as a family unit the molestation starts,
begins. Then when mom moves out to Soda she said it
didn't happen anymore, I'm a:ll right, I don't have to
go to the authorities. Then when mom has to go in to
rehab she moves in with grandma and there is dad again
· starting down the same path. That's when she saw the
hug from behind from her dad. That's when lie pops out
490
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from under the bed covers.
What is that child going to do now? You know, I
got away from it and now I'm kind of back in it again a
few months later, six or seven months later, You are
probably going to think abouttelling somebody. You
might go in with your friend to talk to the resource
officer, Mrs. Oaks-· I can't remember her name for
sure - and my stepdad is touching me inappropriately
9 and I'm uncomfortable with the way he touches me. You
10 might ring the bell. What did she keep saying? Ijust
11 want it to go away, I just want it to go away, In her
12 tears and her anger, I just wantitto go away,
13
And that's what you see there, isn't it? It went
14 away because mom moves out and then it came back. I
15 just wantitto go away. She didn't wantto follow
16 through with it,just wanted itto go away. I don't
17 want-to-file charges,-Idon'twant to-see him go to
18 jail. Just stop it. Get me someplace where I'm safe
19 and secure, Give me a sanctuary. If you don't find a
20 sanctuary, if you can't escape it, then you are going
21 to complain. Are you going to be conflicted? At times
22 I think. I thought she was very believable. If you
· 23 caunot believe two of them saying their father started
24 the same thing about the same age, 10 and 11, what
25 would you do if you just had one? Sometimes we do.
491
1 This case for you jurors is somewhat easier, not
2 totally, but somewhat easier.than if you had one child
3 ta:lking aboutit.
4
· Here there is a pattern. Here there is ahistory, · ·
5 But not as Dr. Rybicki said to imply a negative or
6 . false reporting, but the history when you look at it, .
7 the uncles that have abused children within this
8 family. I think they're believable. I think they're
9 very believable. And I think when you hear their
10 testimony it just -just put yourself there a little
11 bit. What was to be going through a child's mind when
12 they'reputinthissituation? Itdidhappen,
13
And think what else we had there at the end when we
14 go backtosomeofTammy's. Well, they'retryingto
15 makeTammylooklikesomemonster. Well,shegother
16 children to do that The children filed this falsely
17 and made this a:ll up because mom's mad at dad. I
18 thoughtshewasaprettygoodmom. Iknowalotof •
19 moms and a lot of mothers, including my own wife, that
20 would have been far, far more angry than that. Put
21 yourself there. No child.support, dealing with the
22 . drug problem, comes and takes the car, try to get it
23 back,jumps in it, won't get out, comes back, well,
24 it'scommunityproperty, we can't remove it. Man,
25 that's a pretty tough position, especia:llywhen you're
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1 dealing with a drug problem, trying to get it behind
2 you, And then you find out the father, a trusted
3 person hopefully, may be or is touching your daughter.
4 Pretty tough. Do you talk to that person?
5
I thought she showed remarkable control, I didn't
6 see I thought this raging maniac who was willing to use
7 her kids to get back at him. I mean, that's the
8 defense in part. That's a fantasy world. It doesn't
9 exist. Good heavens. This happened what, 2004? And
10 she got out. Separated in 2003, we'rejust now getting
11 divorcefiled. Yeah,shewantedacar. Yeah,shewas
12 upset. Hewouldn'tletherhaveit, Sheneededit.
13 Gosh, I got to go to work. Somebody has got to support
14 these kids. I won't be on Welfare all my life. Help
15 me. Give me a car. He took it away from her and then
16 runs her down, chased her down with the police when she
. 17 .. -C3llle.down and.got-the truck.and this.is.now- - --18 justification? It's 2006. It's already happened.
19
You know, Ijust don't believe when you look at the
20 statistical sampling of false reports by Mydell Yeager
21 and the defense expert that it's not here. Two of them
22 suddenly to support mom because dad's been mean to her,
23 we're going to make up these stories and help put dad
24 injail.
25
What else did I find disturbing to me? She even
493
1 went and talked to him. He called her up and asked her
2 to come down. Hum, .that's interesting. What did he
3 want? You know I didn't do it. You know I didn't do
4 it. What was the condition? If you'd go to Health and
5 Welfare, if you go _to your mom, if you go to the kids
6 and get them to drop this, you can have it all. You
can have everything. You don'tjust get the truck or
the car, you can have it all. Not an admission of
guilt, but certainly ifyou look at your own
experiences it bothers me. T\iat the argument here is
11 you can't have the truck, I need the truck. He's in
12 jail. It's connnlll1ityproperty, If you can get this
13 all dismissed, go to Health and Welfare, get the kids
14 to dismiss this, you can have it all.
15
Ladies and gentlemen of this jury, we believe and
16 I'm telling you, the State has presented a convincing
17 case. Aperfect case, never, I'll never present a
18 perfect~. Certainly not when I have child victims.
19 It is a strong case. I believe it is convincing beyond
· 20 areasonable doubt. He did what we accused hint of.
Thankyou.
THE COURT: Mr. Wuthrich.
23
MR. WUTHRICH: Thankyou.
MR. HELM: let me get my cup, Steve, out of your
way.
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MR. WUTIIRICH: Thankyou.
Well, Itoowanttothankyouforyourtime. Some
3 days are long. Itold you it wouldn't be as dramatic
4 as either Perry Mason or Jack McCoy. Much more like
5 moving pipe, trudging through the mud, swatting
6 mosquiters. But there is a lot of evidence here and I
7 need to go over some of it again, so bear with me,
8 we'll trudge a little more..
9
Mr. Hehn brought up the statistics that Dr. Rybicki
10. testified to, and I want to read the rest of that
11 because he didn't quite tell it all. He said among 129
12 allegation cases- and actually it was two percent of
13 the 9,000 custody eases there was an allegation of
14 sexual abuse. So about 180 eases that was actual
15 allegations of sexual abuse. He said among the 129
16 allegations, 50 percent were believed to involve sexual
17- · -abuse; 17-pereent-hadinsufficientevidence, 33 percent
18 were deemed unlikely. Not the two percent, not the
19 four out of 3,000, was it, that Mydell Yeager testified
20 to, She'd seen more and that's because she's a
21 clinician. That's what she does. She treats abuse
22 victims. So she looks at it with those eyeglasses.
23 All things must be abuse. She doesn't look at it to
.24 examine are there any problems here, is there any
25 credibility issues. She treats abuse victims, She
495
1 proceeds on the assumption that they're abused and she
2 tries to help and treat them. And that's a good thing
3 and we need those people in the world, but that doesn't
4 mean that she brings objectivity to the table.
5
Mr, Hehn says, well, you don't want a rancher that
6 hasn't been out on a ranch. And you want a mechanic-? · youwanttotakeyoureartoamechanic. Well, this
8 isn't a mechanic case. This is an engineering case.
9 We're not asking you to fix the children. We're asking
10 you to diagnose what happened here, to figure out why
11 the bridge fell down, And that's not for a mechanic to
12 do, that'sforanengineertodo.
13
So we brought a different expert. And he's pointed
14 outtoyouanumberofthingsandanumberoffactors ·
15 that he thinl\:s you should consider in a case like this,
16 a number of factors that might contaminate or ruin the
17 results. Ifyou recall, he talked about the first
.
18 factor was the accusing parent. And one of those was,
19 isthereretaliationbytheaccusingparent? Well, we.
20 don't have in essence an accusing parent in this ease,
21 but we have a suspicious grandma. Now, grandma observe
22 a hugging that looks bothersome to her. Don't know if
23 any ofyou had teenage girls as they grow up, but as
24 your little girls grow up they reach a point in time in
25 which there are new boundaries. What used to be
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tickling and fun and wrastling and playing around with
them is no longer touching. And it happens between
moms and boys, too. They just don't want to be kissed
no more when they reach adolescence. Don't do that.
Oh, I won't anymore,
So what she may have observed to be perfectly
innocent is the maturation process of a young girl
reaching her teenage years and no longer wanting to be
hugged by her stepdad, a new setting of boundaries
between them misinterpreted by grandma. Could be wholly
innocent.
Now, the second thing she observes is the popping
out from under the covers. There is three kids in the
room. There is no serious allegation that anything was
going on then, but grandma is now all mad at him and he
leaves. I'd leave too if somebody accused me of
· inappropriately-touching my.child. l'dbe-mad andl-- -·
probably wouldn't throw a scene in front of the
children, so he leaves. Is that an admission that
something happened? Well, she isn't seriously
asserting anything happened then. He just came out from
the covers and she wasn't expecting it, but there were
three kids in that room and in that bed.
The caretaker, Barbara Snow, said that she let
Scott come and stay in the Pocatello home because
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Bubba, James, wouldn't stay without his dad. She's left
with this responsibility to care take for these
children while.mom's in jail. She doesn't really have
custody. Dad has custody rights and one of the kids
wants to live with him so she lets Scott live with him.
She's in a precarious position. Is she retaliatory? We
don't know. What we do know, and by Tammy Erickson's
. own words, is that she was very angry when they
separated in 2003. We do know that the children
believed that mom turned - or that dad turned mom in
for drug abuse. We do know that as a result of that
Tammy was arrested and Tammy went off to drug rehab.
We do know that that hurt that family and that hurt
those children and we know that those children were
angry at their father.
In fact, they believe their father is stalking
their mother, He's putting bugs on their car, That's
their attitude towards their father. So do they want
him to come back and live with them? No. No, the two
girls don't because they're aljgned with mom. They're
aligned with mom. They don'twanthim back there. Does
that make him a good parent? No. No, he probably
should have foreseen the pain it would cause his ·
children ifhe turns his wife in for drugs and causes
this separation in the midst of already a divorce
498

1 situation or a separation scenario.

But that's not a reason to convict him of these
kind of charges, just being a bad parent, which is the
second factor that Dr. Rybicki talked about and that is
the accused parent. Does he have parenting deficits?
Well, yeah, he does. He wasn't thinking, acted out of
rage and anger at his wife at times, he's taken cars
back from her, they're having property disputes. All
of this is going on and it's impacting these children.
It's making them madder. Mom's left without cars. All
of these factors these children are being brought into
and brought a part of and they shouldn't have been, and
that's his parenting deficits. But again, ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, it's not a reason to convict him
of these kinds of serious charges.
Now, the third factor that Dr. Rybicki talked about
-was-c-0ntagion. Dowe-have contagion here? We got a
lot of contagion. We have contagion because the two
cousins, Shaylee and Heather Hess, had already raised
allegations of abuse. But contrary to what the
·prosecutor told you, they had not been prosecuted when
these original allegations took place, were asserted,
· in 2004. The prosecution didn't take place for Troy and
Robert until 2005 and that was in Dr. Rybicki's time
line. So these kids didn't know that dad would go to
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1 jail. These kids did know that their cousins had
2 raised issues of abuse. More importantly, however, a
3 peer had raised allegations of abuse and that's what
4 Lorissa told her grandma at the very beginning.
5 "Grandma, I went in with a friend to say that her
6 stepfather had been touching her and they got it all
7 twisted around and now they think it's me." That was
8 her first statement to grandma, the person she trusted•.
9 That was her first statement.
She's been interviewed at least once by the school,
10
and
we don't have a copy of that. She's then
11
12 interviewed by Detective Vollmer, We don't have a
13 recording of that, although that was her typical
14 policy, Detective Vollmer says that Lorissa says she
15 was touched. She was touched under the clothing on her
16 breasts and over the clothing on her butt, that it all
17 took place in St. Charles, that none ofittook place
18 in Pocatello; that Scott wasn't living with them at
19 that time, that he had been arrested and gone to jail.
20 And they go and they inte.rview Crystal. Crystal says
21 no, nothing has happened to me, No, nothing has
22 happened. And soon Detective Vollmer does her job,
23 does a dettnt interview on her,
So there has been contagion because Lorissa has
24
25 been exposed atleast to two different_ sources, And ·
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even Crystal acknowledges that she knows that her
cousins have been touched, but that she hasn't been
touched. Then she goes home and they talk with
grandma. And only after she talks with both grandma
and Crystal -- or I mean, Lorissa, does Crystal then
say, "Yeah, I've been touched, too." ls that group
contagion? Could there be any more group contagion?
Only after she talks with grandma.
Now grandma may be looking through rose-colored
eyes. You know, I'm not saying that grandma
intentionally sets out to manipulate these children.
Bullet's admit it. It's convenient for grandma that
these kids have been touched because that's a way of
keeping Scott away from them. That's a way of
maintaining this custody that's very fragile to her
while her daughter is in rehab. And she's trying to
·me care ·of1lrese kidsforher·daughter·and restore
thatfamilyto her daughter when she gets out. And
she's in a very fragile situation so it is convenient.
So we have a number ofcontagion. We have peer
contagfon, the cousins, the friend and the role figure
of grandma.
Now, the last thing that he mentioned is context
and in what context did the allegation arise. And
Dr. Helm -- or Mr. Helm didn't want you to look at
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1 Dr. Rybicki's discussion of that because context here
2 is bad. It's not in the actual filing of divorce, but
3 it's in the separation of the family. It's in the
4 alienation of the father and it's in the alignment of
5 the mother. Now what evidence do we.have of that?
6 Well, contrary to what Tammy Erickson told you that she
7 never kept her kids from Scott, Scott spends every
8 weekend of the entire summer of2003 after they
9 separated with his cousin, Audra Bell, in Afton because
10 he doesn't have visitation with his kids. In fact, he
11 leaves one time to go over and see Tammy.
12
He doesn't have visitation with his kids. They're
13 angry. Even mom admits those children believe dad
14 turned her in to the cops for drugs. They believe that,
15 . They're angry. She promotes that anger. Lorissa said
. 16 shesawthebugonthecarthatdadisstalkingher
· 17 with and Crystal tells the New Beginnings lady my dad
18 · is stalking my mom. Are they aligned with mom? Better
19 believeit. Context. Wehavetheworstpossible
20 context.
· 21
Sodotheyhaveamotivetolie? Well, they do.
22 James apparently wants to stay with dad and dad keeps
23 coming around and they're mad at dad. They're aligning
24 withtheirmom. Theydon'twanttobewithdad,
25 They've been living with mom since June of 2003 till
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January of 2004. They've been living in Soda, just
recently moved to Pocatello, now they're living with
3 grandma. They've been living in an environment where
4 they have been alienated from dad, angered at dad,
5 promoted against dad, and he wants to move in the house
6 now. He wants to come back and stay with them. Are they
7 angry? Yeah. Does abuse come along as a pretty good
8 way to get dad out of here?
9
The next one that Dr. Rybicki talked about is you
10 got to look at implausibility. Let's talk about terms
11 of plausibility. The story of2001; the four children ·
12 will get off the school bus in St. Charles, they'll
13 walk to their home. Tammy now says, Well, two of them
14 might have gone over to grandpa and grandma Glade's,
15 That might account for two of them, it doesn't account
16 for the other one. Lorissa can't tell us why she's
17- --suddenly-at ,r.30-she!s walking in-to the housealone,
18 But she said she walked in, she put her bag down on the
19 kitchen table and then he starts touching her. Just
20 out of the blue. Is that plausible? He doesn't groom
21 herinanyway. Hedoesn'taskherquestions. He
22 doesn't come up to her and just start giving her a back
23 rub or something like that. She says he walks right
24 over and starts fondling her. Is it plausible? ·
25
One of the things that Dr. Rybicki talked about
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1 that was real important was grooming things, you know.
2 Had the parent been grooming the child for a while?
3 Had he slowly introduced touching or sexual themes or
4 talked about sex or bribery or those kinds of things
5 where he had some control over this child and would
6 think that he could get away with this? Or did he at
7 least threaten her or in any way tell her not to say,
8 . to tell? None of that here. If we believe her story,
9 she walks in, she sets down her bag and dad just starts
10 over and starts groping her out of the clear blue. ls
11 .it plausible?
The next one, 2002, she says happened in the .
12
13 trailer behind Margaret and Glade's house. We
14 introduced Exhibit 2. They didn't buy the trailer until
15 December of 2003. Glade testified he had to sign-off 011
16 the loan. Mrs. Snow testified she sold it to him and
17 then after they paid her she gave him the title and he
18 came within a day or two and picked up the trailer. .
19 That's December of 2003, Th.at trailer isn't at
20 Margaret and Glade's, but that's what this witness,
21 Lorissa Hottel, said she was abused in 2002 in that
22 trailer. It wasn't there.
So they put on Tammy to try to say, Well, Margaret
23
24 and Glade have other trailers, they have their own car
25 trailers. Why would Scott be sleeping in there? In
1
2
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fact, why would Scott and Lorissa be sleeping at
Margaret and Glade's in 2002 at all? They only live a
block down the street. Why wouldn't they be sleeping
in their own house? Is it credible? Is it believable?
Maybe she got her year wrong. Well, but wait a minute.
2003 she had already left. They still don't have the
trailer. In fact, dad continues to live in the home
after they separate until the house is foreclosed on.
That's about four months. That's right about the time
he buys the trailer.
So; is it believable? And that's an important
thing. You've gotto ask that in context of these
allegations because this is an extremely susceptible
situation. We're talking about divorce, we're talking
about separation, we're talking about break up of a
family. We got lots of emotions flying around and
·certainly in1his·case-we-gotlots·ofangers going····
around and we got lots of side-taking going around.
Let's look at Lorissa's testimony. She first tells
her gramdma it's abig mistake. She then tells the
police officer, no, it happened, but only in Bear Lake
under her clothing. Then she writes her dad and says
she's sorry she said anything. She tells her cousin
Melissa Lish, no, she said it only because her friend
was making the same allegation against his stepfather.
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She tells her Aunt Janette and her cousin Larry, no,
it's all lies. She tells the Court at the pretrial she
can only remember it happening three times. And she
tells officer Martinez in this interview, no, it
happened all the time. We're not talking about little
discrepancies. We're talking about day and night.
We're talking about events she either says happens all
the time or she can only tell it happened three times.
That's a major difference. And if it happened under
the clothing, why would she say now it only happened
over the clothing? Very strange.
Now, the mother admits further in context when she
came back in July of 2004, she and Scott tried to get
back together again. She believes that these
allegations by her daughters are true. She tries to
get back together with the guy or does she believe what
Scott told her that somebody had come and interviewed
him and they had been dropped? Is that more credi'ble
than what she told you here today?
The other one that's truubling to me is ifGrandma
Snow really believes this happened, why does she say
that she then sent Crystal off to a birthday party with
the Ericksons? Ifshe really believes this happened,
do you send this child off all by herself with the
·
Ericksons? Grandma Snow obviously comes off to me as
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very protective. Is that realistic? Can you imagine
doing that yourself with your girls?
Context. Let me tell you what context is here. As
long as the mom is out ofjail and able to take care of
these kids, nothing is happening, nothing is being
pursued. When mom goes to jail the first time, the
allegations are made and it keeps Scott away from those
children, then mom comes back and nothing happens in
regard to that. And then in 2006 when she goes back to
· jail, he goes to try and assert his custodial rights,
this issue is raised again. That's the context. There
is abuse allegations when mom is gone and unavailable
to take care of these kids and there is no abuse
allegations when mom is here and able to take custody
of those children. That's a dangerous context, ladies
and gentlemen.
· -·I wanHotalk aboutacoupJe.oHhejury
instructions. Well, let me close a little bit with
Dr. Rybicki. He said the factors in this case were not
adequately considered and that the investigatiim was
not properly done according to standards. And he
pointed to standards they have, standards in abuse
allegation cases. Mydell Yeager; she's not a member of
that group so she doesn't have to point to any
standards. She can go by her intuition and her
507
experience. All of which is with abuse victims, very
little of which is with false reporting cases. Of
course, she acknowledges she might not know because she
isn't looking for that. She isn't looking for false
reporting so she might not see it. Dr. Rybicki is
trying to be objective and look on both sides of the ·
coin, false cases and true cases. And he talked about
that, different dynamics and the different ·
possibilities you might have in this case.
I agree children are a protected class and they
ought to be protected from bad parenting as well. But
that's not the crime we're here to deal with. Mom does
have a drug problem. No question about it. She's had
problems with it. Bnt to a great extent these children
blame dad for mom's absence in the home. Grandma saw
things that she thought were uncomfo\'blble, but they're
just as easily explained by maturity as they are by
anything, any abuse allegations.
And it's ironic. They've scoured their history as
a family and they come np with two things that were
observed by someone else that they think is suggestive
that abuse is going on here and that's the
uncomfortable hug and the popping out from under the
sheets •. That's it.
Examine your own lives, ladies and gentlemen. If
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1 someone wanted to look at you and look at you as a

,

,

2 perpetrator of your children, what instances could they
3 look at in the most negative light and come out with
4 and couldn't they come out with more than two?
5 Sometimes when you come out of the bathroom and you
6 weren't dressed and your kids saw you, or some time
7 when you accidently walked in on your children and they
8 weren't dressed. All kinds of situations that happen
9 in family context, they could come up with only two.
Now I want to talk about the plausibility in the
10
11 context of Crystal's allegation. First off, Crystal
12 never says anything until after she's been contaminated. .
13 by both grandmother and Lorissa. And she loves Lorissa
14 and she admitted that. She supports Lorissa. Is her
15 story as equally explainable in supporting her
16 stepsister and anger at her father as it is that
17---tlomething-happened?-·Why,-yes. I-Vs-equally-plausible.
But let's take the facts that she says. First off,
18
19 she told the New Beginnings lady it happened after her
20 birthday. She tied it to an event in her life, after
21 her birthday. Her birthday being July 9th. She said
22 it was '04. She swore in this courtroom under oath it
23 happened after her birthday in '04. And then they go
24 have a conversation with grandmother and mom and they
25 realize, well, it couldn't have happened in July of '04
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when I've already reported it in April of '04. Oops.
So she changes her testimony. She picks March. It had
to be March. Not related to any significant event in
her life like her previous testimony was. Is that
believable? She says it happened when Bubba, James,
was right in the bed next to her. Is that plausible?
tgain, no bribing, no telling her don't tell mom, don't
tell anyone, Is this plausible? Is this believable if
he's genuinely a pedophile preying on kids? Is this
plausible?
Lastly, they talk about his conversation with his
wife when hetells her to get these charges dropped.
And she acknowledges that he at all times professes his
innocence. She admits that. It's just as equally
likely that he felt like he was being blackmailed, that
he felt like she had those kids turned on hinl and she
was going to put the screws to hinl and he could just
take it or she could just have the property they have
been fighting over for the past five years, viciously
fighting over. He didn't give me the car, he didn't
. give me the truck, he didn't give me this, he didn't
give me that. Isn't that just as likely? I mean, you
now have hinl in jail over this and I'm innocent so I
give up, I surrender, You can have it all, just tell
the truth. Just have those kids tell the truth.
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I have two jury instructions I just briefly want to
touch on with you, ladies and gentlemen. The first one
is Number 27. It says·· or not 27, I'in sorry. It must
be back. It's Number 30. "You must not draw any
inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant
does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by
you or enter in your deliberations in any way.11 The
decision whether or not the defendant testified, one,
that's preserved and reserved to the defendant in
consultation with his lawyer. You may not infer
.anything from that. It's a constitutional right.
And finally, I'd like you to look at Iustruction
Number 4, which was the first jury instruction in the
first set that you were given. So if it's not numbered
just go through till you get to the one that starts, "A
defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be
-innocent.'! It-should-stal't-0ut-ru1d-say,!'Adefendant in
a criminal action is presumed to be innocent." Has
anybody found that?
TIIB COURT: It does have a 4 on it.
MR. WUTHRICH: Oh, does it? Okay.
It defines reasonable doubt. It tells you the
State has the burden of proving the. defendant beyond a
reasonable doubt. And I told you at the beginning in
this case I can't prove a negative. I can't prove

1 Scott Erickson is innocent. No man can. And we have a
2 heavy burden here. They didn't say it happened October
3 13th of 2001 where I could go and get his work records
4
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and show that he was working out of state in Montana on
October 13th 2001 •. They didn't show·· they didn't
state that it happened on May 27fu 2002 where I could
go get his work records, I could go find out ifhe was
on a date with someone, have an alibi witness. No. It
happened some time in 2001. It happened some time in
2002. Crystal is 2003 to 2004. Can each of you account
for every single day in two years? You can't.
· So it's a hard burden. I can't prove a negative. I
can't prove to you that he's innocent, And that's why
the State has the burden of proving that he's guilty.
And it's a high sta!Idard, beyond a reasonable doubt.
It's the state of the case, which after comparison and
consideration of all of the evidence, leaves the mind
of the jurors in a condition that they cannot say they
feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the
truth of the charge. To a moral certainty, That's what
you have to be convinced of•. It's no~ "Do I tiiink
something might have happened here?" That's not the
standard. The standard is to a moral certainty.
And as Dr. Rybicki explained to you in this case, ·
with some bad interviews and with no tape recorded
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interviews, some of which we don't even know how many
numbers there are, with the contagion factors, with the
alignment with mother and the disaligoment or
alienation against father factors, all of those things
cut against the credibility, cut against the
credibility of this allegation. I can't say to a moral
certainty it didn't happen. They can't prove it did
happen. They can't prove that the moon is made of
green cheese. I justhave to argue to you that they
haven't proved that because I can't prove it isn't

· true.
That's my argomentto you, ladies and gentlemen. . .
13 They have not made their case beyond a reasonable
14 doubt. Would any of you feel comfortable being
15 convicted by the state of this evidence, by the
16 testimony of Lorissa Hottel who has at least three
· 17 --tirnes-recanted,by-thetestimonyof-Grystal Erickson
18 who initially recants and only after she has her
19 .conversations with grandma and with Lorissa that she
20 ever said anything ever happened to her? You know
21 she's contaminated. In fact, she honestly told you,
. 22 her testimony in this courtroom this week was as a
23 result of her sitting down and talking with mom and
24 grandma trying to figure out a date when it might have
25 happe11ed.
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1
Is that good evidence? Would you feel
2 appropriately convicted by an abiding state of that
3 kind of evidence by children who have a motive to lie?
4
They're angry with this dad. They might even be
I
5 · justifiably angry at this dad, but not for sexual abuse
6 but for what he'd done in their mind. Caused her notto
7 be a part of their lives for sigrrlficant periods of
8 time, not giving them a car, not providing them with
-9 the support the mom wants, stalking her, all these bad
10 things.
. 11
This is not a case, ladies and gentlemen, in which
12 the State has met its burden. Not by any expert
13 - determination, not by any common sense determination.
14 We ask you to render a verdict of not guilty on all
15 charges. Thank you.
16
·TIIE COURT: Mr. Helm, you may do your short
17 . rebuttal.
·
18
MR. HELM: I guess I'll plow this field a little
19 bit again. I have what was on the screen. I got to
20 get back to where it said. I guess the thing here is
21 both- all the studies show thatfalse reporting is
22 just very, very rare, aimo~ rninuscule. Perhaps four in
23 3000 based on actlial experie11ce ofMydell. And the
24 study cited by the defense witness of the percentage of
25 false allegation in child custody cases, they were ·
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talking about two percent, but it says less than two
percent. Then they say among the 129 allegation cases,
that's what we got right here, that was the slide, 50
percent of those are children less than six•.Then you
have·· that brings it down to approximately 65. 65
percent of those with girls. So if you take the 65
percent of the 65 and then 50 percent were actually
believed to be, you come down another half of that and
then 17 percent had insufficie11t evidence. It doesn't
mean it didn't happen or it did and then you're down to
one third. That is almost identical when you do the
mathematics to what the experience was of Dr. Mydell.
It's just remote, almost unusual. Just - you can't
say it never happens because it does, and it's a
terrible thing when it does.
They're telling you it happened in this case, that
both-these girls don'thave-anysay.-'l'wo girls got up
and lied. There is really no custody battle here.
This is when we have custody battles. There is no
custody battle here. They're trying to convince you
and make-believe there is a custody battle. Oh, gee
whiz, morn moved out and he's over at Audra Bell's on
all the weekends. Good heavens. He'sgotajob. He's
got money, Now these guys just show up, hey, I want my
shared,custody. Idahoisa50/5ostate. Unlessyou're
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proved to be an unfit parent, you get shared custody of
your kids, joint custody, legal and physieal. Been the
law for a long time. Pretty easy. And morn's taking
these kids and not letting you visit That's a pretty
easy remedy. Atleast he's got ajob and he's got some
money. Her remedy might be_more difficult because of
her financial situation circmnstances, but he's got an
easy remedy. Just walks into court unless mom can
prove he's unfit That's what the law says. I don't
think there was a custody issue. They never went to
court. Never any custody battle here. ·There is as of
aweekago.
·
So to suggest that this is a motive for lying,just
ask yourself. He wants to talk about causation and
probability and possibilities. I would tell you, I can
never prove it where there is no possibility. There is
always the mere possibility when you read these
experts. What does he say on most of those statements?
I.et me grab my glasses again. I'm not sure I
understood it, but assuming I understand it, unknown
dynamics. And he's talking about the 2001 alleged
incident with Lorissa and Scott, and Lorissa claims
Scott fondled her breast and butt while living in St
Charles. No official report made. Unknown dynamics a
that time.

516

II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II

II

I
I
I

I
I

,.
I
I
I

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Stepdaughter's at the age of 11 at the time.
Emerging adolescent issue, disturbed marital dynamics.
We don't know - how does he know there is disturbed
marital dynamics in 2001? No evidence of that, yet oh
boy, this is an expert, That's all he does is go
around testifying. He's sure that was something. He
doesn't have anything there. How does he know the
dynamics? How does he know there was a disturbed
marital?
Possible discussion. This was 2002 between, it
looks like May 102 to September '02, alleged fondling
of Heather Hess by Troy Erickson, the defendant's
brother, at Margaret Erickson's home, same location.
Allegedfondling of Shaylee Hess, 14, by Troy Erickson
and Robert Walker, Again, brothers and half-brpthers.
No official report made. What does he put down?
. . 17 -Fossiblediscussion-lUld-0ialog between-cousins.-·18 Collusion. Good heavens, folks. If you're going to · ·
19 form opinions, get a factual basis for it. We don't
20 have anything like that, do we? Possible. We take
21 what is mere possibility, absolutely n9 evidence, and
22 drew a conclusion from the expert they've got to be
23 telling the truth. Possible elaboration, memory
24 revision, suggestibility.
Possible elaboration, memory revision. Possible,
25
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1 possible, possible, possible. I would agree that when
2 we're talking about child molestation there is a lot of
3 things possible. To use that as the basis not to
4 believe these children is just phony. If all it does
5 is to bring an expert, a paid expert who does it for a
6 living, they come into a courtroom and tell you of
7 possibilities with no factual basis for much of it,
8 . that's all it takes for reasonable doubt, we will never
9 convict another person of molesting children.
10
Ifwe are held to the standard that I have to have
11 the perfect interviewer and the perfect situation so
12 there is no possibility -- even if you had a perfect
13 interview he's still saying, well, we got possible
14 family dynamics at work here. Possible they talked
15 this over with their cousins. It's just not a real
16 world. Ifthat is what this jury, ifthat's what Main
17 Street in Bear Lake County is telling me or lilw
18 enforcement, it's impossible. I cannot meet that ivory
19 tower attitude. It's just not there.
20
Think about it yourself. Ifyou had a child in
21 that position or a grandchild, it would never happen.
22 You would probably question it What do you mean?
23 Whatdidhesay? Whatdidhedo? What's this
24 professor-what's this doctor going to come back and
25 say? Gosh, you contaminated them. You should have
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rushed them off to a sterile room and had them all
videotaped and have an expert come in and do this
forensic examination. Now think about that. That's
where they would want us to be, and in a perfect world
I would agree with that. I do not have a perfect world.
I will never have a perfect world. !will never have
the perfect sexual allegati!lll case. It's just not
real.
We can look at some of these things, and I'm not
going to be able to go over them, I don't want to go
over all them. I want to kind of focus on some of the
things the defense attorney said ifl can read my
writing. Amajor property dispute going on between mom
and dad. Not a property fight. I can tell you that.
I've been a lawyer long enough. They lost the property
to the bank. They lost the cars to the bank. They don't
havealot to fight over, Theydon1thave1thouse, ·They're fighting over a few old cars. But major
property Joss? No. She needed a vehicle to getto and
from work, needed a vehicle to take care of our kids.
That's a major property? That's how defense
characterized it contrary to the facts.
Crystal. She swore in this courtroom that it
happened on her birthday in 2004. She never swore in
this courtroom. You heard her testimony. She thought
519
it happened when? Some time January, February, March.
I think she probably isolated it in March of 2004. Did ·
she correct prior testimony? Yes. But he said she
swore in this courtroom.· She did not swear in this
courtroom.
Now, he asked her at the preliminary hearing if she
was correct. Well, that was pretty obvious, wasn't it?
My birthday is I think July 9th or something she said.
I reported this in April. I'm now alleging it happened ·
after I reported it. Well, she was confused on the ·
time. I was confused. Well, that's improbable. When
they report it there had to be a solution and event.
· Well, she knows when she was living at grandma's. She
knew her mother was in rehab and narrows it down,
doesn't she? January, February, March because!
reported it in April. I don't have to be a rocket
scientist. I can be a confused child to still figure
· that out. That's all that happened. Butto suggest she
· got up here in this courtroom and swore to it is just
not there. You've got your notes. You heard it. It
didn't happen.
. The other thing, when you go back to Bright
Tomorrow, I think this is an interview- I understand
we had to bring this case up almost three years after
the event. In some respects the report is notreally
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1 that late, it's just that we dropped the ball and
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didn't get it and I told you that in the beginuing. Do
not blame the children for that. He was trying to make
something out of that. Well, they brought it up in
2004 and then it was dropped and then they bring it
back up again in 2006 because she's gone back in for
some more rehab. We dropped the ball. That's just the
gravel and the straw. It's just not true. They brought
itup.
When you hear her testimony in 2007 I believe it
is, ifI got my time right, it's at Bright Tomorrow.
What does she say? What does she tell you? What came ·
out? Is this going to be used to put my dad in jail?
She wants to know that before she's going to talk.
Nervous, scared. Is this going to be used to put my
dad injail? Still reluctant. Always reluctant. If
-they're·motivatedtolie-to·protect-mom;-they're······· ·
anxious to testify, they're willing. "Let me get up
there. Let me tell you," That's not the case here.
Draw upon your common sense. ls it a story that has
some fficonsistency? Yes, it is. It always will be.
He can't offer an alibi because we can't pin a
time. Well, you can always give notice of alibi.
Don't buy that one either. It's another smoke screen.
Did you notice an alibi? You got to start providing
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it. It doesn't exist in these cases. Not going to
happen.
The motive for lying is custody of the kids.
Probably the motive is just the opposite. He might
criticize mom for not being more protective, criticize
mom for not being there, I think those are all valid,
but to now suggest that Crystal and Lorissa are lying
on the basis of custody is ridiculous, Lorissa is 18
years old. She's been at Job Corps for the last two or
three years. Crystal's with Health and Welfare. Grandma
is acting as. afoster home. Mom to. this day is not
even asking for custody as I understood what they're
saying. Doesn't want dad to have it, but she
understands she's got some problems and got some trust
· to rebuild with her own children. She's looking for
lhat extended family to help her.
Barbara was there. Barbara somehow on lhe defense
part becomes lhe evil-doer: You know, and I understand
.that he misstates that. My recollection was Barbara
didn't report anything, Barbara didn'ttell him to get
out. She said she did not know about it until the
officers came to her house or called her on the phone
and told her. She had suspicions. She didn't run out,
oh, chicken ~ttle, the sky is falling in. She showed .
amazing restraint, remarkable restraint. She never said
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whattheysaidshesaid. "I would leave, too." Well,
she didn't tell him to leave. I said, "What happened?"
"Well, he grabbed his bag and left." She never kicked
him out. He was back later. Health and Welfare said he
can't live there anymore after these allegations came
back. Moved out then. But the characterization that
Barbara Snow is an evil monster, kind of the unintended
person that motivated the children is false, not based
on anything you heard here.
And that was not what Tammy said. She's wanting
some vehicle to provide money, jobs, things for her
kids. Help me out. I know your parents won'tlet me
have it and ifyou tell them, you know •• she didn't
say get the kids to tell the truth, you can have it. .
She said go get it dismissed. Talk to your mom, talk
to Health and Welfare, talk to the kids. Have them go
· -in-and dismiss-it.-That'swhat-she said,- . . .... .
I think you could talk about alot of things on the
time line, I think you can talk a lot about the
possibilities, but we have to focus upon the children
and the dynamics of what's going on in their mind.
Focus upon what some of the experts told us. Look at
that. Look at that line and just does your gut tell
you they're telling the truth? I'll be the first to
admit; if you do not believe Lorissa, then you should
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1 acquit this man .. If you do not believe Crystal, then
2 you should acquit this man. If you believe they both
3 got up and falsified these statements for whatever
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reason, you just simply do not believe the girls, then
you must acquit.
Ifyou believe the girls are telling the truth when
they said their. father fondled them; when they said
their father did lewd acts or sexual battery, ifyou
believe those things took place based upon all the
evidence at this trial, then you are duty bound to
convict the same way. Ifyou don't believe, you should
acquit.
· I think they're believable. I can look at some of
the defense witnesses and one of them I think as I
recall was - let me get back to my notes; I think it
was Janette Erickson - a lot of family in here
testifying to save their uncle. She got up and tried
to make some statement out ofLorissa's mouth. And I
want to get it, my notes, so I can quote direct. "All
that bullshit She was sick of it. Just a bunch of
lies,• Does that mean she thinks the family is lying
about her, they're telling stories about her, calling
her names, suggesting she's not believable? That just
as easily could be that. But I'm not even sure she
said it because we bring her son in and he says, "Tell
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1 Scott not to worry about anything because nothing

....
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2 happened." Two witnesses, both for the defense, one the
3 mother, one the son and I get two statements like that.
4 They're not even close, It's not believable.
5
Remember, Glade told you he_had to recant some of
6 his testimony at his last son's trial. I have family
7 testifying for family, They have bias, They have
8 prejudice, What did the Walker girl tell you? I asked
9 her first, "Do you have any feelings toward me? Do you
10 dislike me?" ''No," What was her last statement? "I
11 don't like you. You put my dad in jail.• I put his
12 brother in jail for similar conduct
And did the tape really play that long? I listened
13
14 to the tape, but I've listened to it a lot more than
15 you and probably in a lot better circumstances. I can
16 hear the good-bye, "I got to put my cigarette out.
17 Good-bye."llut Whanlid Walker say? Well,the
18 conversation continued for a half-an-hour. Tammy said
19 it's one of those i,ld recording machines. It's not
20 digital. Put a tape in them and they can record a lot
21 of conversation to get to the end of the tape. Why
22 isn't there other conversations on that tape? Why did
23 Ijusthaveone? I don't know. Whyisn'tthenext
24 half-hour on there? 1have family protecting family.
25 I have family willing to get up, stretch, or just

1 father, this defendant, be convicted. What he
2 breached, the trust he breached, cannot happen without
3 consequences. The trust he breached as aparent to his
4 daughters cannot happen withi,ut consequeuces, You must
5 convict him to serve justjce. Aconviction of guilty
6 is justice in this case, Thank you,
THE COURT: Madam clerk, will you swear the marshal
7
in
as
the bailiff for the jury?
8
(Marshal sworn,)
9
THE
COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, this case is now
10
11 in your hands. The bailiff will take you into the jury
12 room to deliberate.
BAILIFF: Do you have the exhibits and the verdict
13
14 form?
THE COURT: We do. The exhibits are right here,
15
the
verdict and the original instructions.
16
17 ----BAILIFF:--Okay.Thankyou.- - -- ·· ·· THE COURT: Court's in recess.
18
(In the absence of the jury.)
19
MR. WUTHRICH: I have one motion before we recess,
20
21 your Honor.
THE COURT: Oh, let's get the door shut first.
22
You can be seated.
23
THE COURT: Mr. Wuthrich, go ahead.
24
MR. WUTHRICH: YourHonor,Ididn'twantto
25
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simply tell falsehoods or mistaken.
Audra Bell. Yep, there every weekend. That was in ·
what, 2004? There every weekend. I didn't know what it
really had much to do with the case, whether these
girls are telling the truth or not, but that's what we
heard. Ijust think the bottom line is this, it's our
communities and our families, our children.· We have
the legal, moral, ethic obligation to protect them.
You set a standard for myself as prosecutor. You set
the standard for law enforcement. We look at these
cases very carefully. What is the standard in Bear
lake County by ajury on what they're going to accept
as proof of child molestation? That's all it's about.
And if you're saying Mr. Hehn, Lorissa, Crystal,
Officer Martinez, it's just not there, I've got to have
more than this, we understand that, but there is also a
· downside to it. lcan'tbringyoutheperfectcase.
There will always be the possibility there. I bring
you two people molested by their father at pretty much
thesameage. Onegivescredibilitytotheother. One
collaborates the other. The pattern is similar.
. Circumstancesaresimilar. Youasajuroraresayingl
don't believe either one of them.
Ladies and gentlemen, I tell you this is proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. Justice demands that this
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1 interrupt Mr. Hehn in this, and I had different
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opinions of it, but it appears to me that he commented
on the evidence improperly. He specifically said, "I
find them credible," And, you know, rather than they
· are credible, and he made it personal in that context,
and I do believe that violates the rule. But I've had
Judge Harding rule against me on that And I know it's ..
Ardee's technique and I know it's his style, but I
think it crosses that line, There are cases out there
that say that the prosecutor calinot make those kind of
comments and you're not supposed to make those commeD
on the evidence. And I thought in his .,. not so much
in the rebuttal, but in bis opening argument, that he
did cross that line on at least three occasions. And I
guess I move for mistrial on those grounds,
Where he specifically commented that, "I think
. they're credible, I think the story was credible."
Those I remember specifically, and I'd have to go
through a transcript, but I know there were three I had
in my mind. I ahnost objected immediately and brought
itto the Court's attention, but the last time I did
that with Mr. Harding, Judge Harding, he said, no, no,
hecansaythat. Andsoljustdidn't. Ihopethe
Court understands, and I don't know ifthat's a timing
issue, I should have done it differently or not.
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